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1975 DEVELOPMENTS IN WELFARE LAW-AID TO
FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN
With the financial collapse of New York City in 1975, pleas for
reduced welfare expenditures intensified.' Efforts by the states to
narrow the scope of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) included restrictive legislation designed to limit the class of
eligible recipients,2 force employable recipients into the labor mar-
ket,3 disregard the actual motives of recipients who reduced their
assets by applying presumptions of fraudulent intent,4 and decrease
income exemptions.5 Congress and the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare (HEW) also took measures to reduce costs by
attempting to enforce child support obligations, 6 restrict resource
exemptions,7 and decrease administrative errors. 8 In general, the
courts resisted such cost-saving devices when they conflicted with the
interests of individual recipients9 or unduly narrowed the class of
beneficiaries.' 0 This Note surveys these recent developments in the
AFDC program."
I
QUALITY CONTROL
There were significant developments in 1975 in federal efforts
to reduce erroneous payments and eligibility determinations made
by states participating in the AFDC program. HEW continued in its
efforts, which began in the early nineteen-sixties,' 2 to protect the
federal treasury from incorrect state-authorized payments by
promulgating new quality control regulations. 3 These regulations
1 N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1976, § 1, at 1, col. 8; id. Sept. 15, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 5; id. Oct. 17,
1975, § 1, at 1, col. 6.
2 See notes 227, 249, 298 and accompanying text infra.
3 See notes 284-85 and accompanying text infra.
See note 189 and accompanying text infra.
5 See note 78 and accompanying text infra.
6 See notes 164-71 and accompanying text infra.
See notes 58-62 and accompanying text infra.
s See note 13 and accompanying text infra.
See generally notes 53-97, 219-319 and accompanying text infra.
10 See generally notes 219-319 and accompanying text infra.
" The following survey parallels in format and serves to update Note, 1974 Developments
in Welfare Law-Aid to Families With Dependent Children, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1975).
12 See Lurie, Major Changes in the Structure of the AFDC Program Since 1935, 59 CORNELL L.
REv. 825, 852-53 (1974).
13 45 C.F.R. §§ 205.40-.41 (1975) (quality control and federal financial participation); id.
§ 206.10 (eligibility determination); id. § 233.10 (coverage and eligibility).
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furthered the development of standards for evaluating the accuracy
of administrative decisions on AFDC claims.
The quality control system in AFDC is designed to identify and
reduce the incidence of incorrect determinations through the use of
a statistically reliable sample of cases. By 1976, states must reach a
target level case error 14 rate of three percent for ineligibility, five
percent for overpayments, and five percent for urnderpayments.15
To the extent that a state's positive error rate exceeds the tolerance
levels for ineligibility and overpayment, a fiscal sanction of withhold-
ing federal matching funds is imposed.' 6
The 1975 revisions of the quality control program introduced
several major changes. The former regulations made no attempt to
provide workable definitions of such key concepts as "case error,"
"overpayment," and "ineligibility." In order to eliminate the result-
ing confusion, the new regulations introduce definitions of these
and other terms.' 7 These definitions should resolve a number of
14 "Case error" is defined in the new regulation as "an overpayment, underpayment or
payment for ineligibility, as defined in this section." Id. § 205.40(a)(2). See notes 20-21 and
accompanying text infra.
15 45 C.F.R. § 205.41(a) (1975).
16 Id. §§ 205.41(b)-(c). For the purpose of determining the amount to be excluded from
the federal share when the penalty is imposed, case error rates for ineligibility and overpay-
ments (percentages) are converted into dollar amounts. Id. § 205.41(d). Payments for
emergency assistance, AFDC foster care and presumptive eligibility, and vendor payments are
excluded from the penalty provision. Id.
No penalty is imposed for failure to reach the underpayment tolerance level. Moreover,
states are not even required to report erroneous denials or terminations of assistance. The
emphasis of the quality control program is on positive errors, which deplete the federal
treasury. Although HEW contends that the quality control program is designed to serve the
dual purposes of maintaining the integrity of the public fisc and assuring that states devote
their limited resources to eligible individuals (see 40 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (1975)), the principal
objective of the program, as it is currently designed, is not to encourage accuracy but to reduce
expenditures.
AFDC quality control has also been sharply criticized for its failure to provide incentives
for reducing negative errors. See Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical
and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social
Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. Rzv. 772, 808-09 (1974). Although HEW has agreed to consider
the suggestion, drawn in response to its new regulations, that states whose underpayment
rates are less than the 5% tolerance level be allowed to offset underpayments against ineligibil-
ity and overpayment disallowances (see 40 Fed. Reg. 32,956 (1975)), its present position is that
underpayments will be corrected by the states in the process of reducing overpayments. 39
Fed. Reg. 37,195 (1974). Available statistics, however, do not support this optimism. STAFF OF
JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 93D CONG., 2D SEss., HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC INCOME TRANSFER
PROGRAMS: 1975, at 160 (Joint Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK].
Moreover, it has been argued that the unavoidable result of interest in and sanctions for
positive errors will be an increase in negative errors, because all doubts will be resolved against
the recipient. Mashaw, supra, at 809.
17 45 C.F.R. § 205.40(a) (1975).
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issues encountered under the prior system. For example, it is now
clear that a payment to a household in which no member is eligible
for assistance constitutes an erroneous determination of eligibility,
whereas a payment to an entire household in which some but not all
of the members are eligible is an overpayment. 18 Payments less than
five dollars in error need no longer be reported as case errors. 19
In an effort to furnish standards for determining when a case
error exists and avoid penalizing states for reasonable delays, an
administrative grace period has been established during which states
will not be subject to fiscal sanctions for failing to adjust for changes
in a recipient's circumstances.2 0 After the change occurs, the states
are given an additional month in which to discover and correct the
error, unless a fair hearing has been requested prior to termination
or reduction of assistance. A fair hearing decision affecting the
recipient's eligibility or benefit level is considered a change in cir-
cumstances for purposes of the grace period; the state then has
roughly one month in which to adjust the recipient's grant.2'
The new regulations, by changing the standard against which
quality control reviewers compare actual assistance determinations,
also afford the states somewhat greater flexibility in altering their
AFDC plans. Quality control reviewers, in determining whether a
case error has been made, must now compare the state's determina-
tions in the sample group to "permissible state practices, ' 22 as de-
fined in the regulations,23 rather than to the state plan, as formerly
required. As a result, states are now able to put proposed AFDC
Is Id. §§ 205.40(a)(3)-(4).
19 Id. §§ 205.40(a)(4)-(5).
20 Id. § 205.40(a)(2). Although id. § 206. 10(a)(9)(ii) (1975) requires prompt reconsidera-
tion of a case only where the welfare agency has knowledge of the recipient's change in
circumstances, the grace period begins to run in the month immediately following the month
in which the change actually occurs, notwithstanding the agency's lack of knowledge of the
change. For example, if there is an increase in a recipient's wages in June, the agency has until
August I to adjust his grant before overpayments will be counted as case errors. Whether the
agency discovers the increase by August 1 is immaterial. Reconsideration of the case, however,
is not required until the agency actually discovers the increase in wages. A knowledge
provision was omitted from the grace period in order to encourage states to develop methods
of detecting changes in a recipient's circumstances. 40 Fed. Reg. 32,954-55 (1975).
21 45 C.F.R. § 205.40(a)(2) (1975). The practice of allowing the states a limited period of
time in which to correct errors and avoid financial penalties is based on the realization that
states need time to discover changes in a recipient's circumstances and to make appropriate
adjustments. See 40 Fed. Reg. 32,954 (1975). With respect to hearing decisions, however, states
do not need additional time in which to discover the "change in circumstances." No reason
exists, other than the simplicity of a uniform rule, for allowing states a full month or more in
which to respond to hearing decisions without incurring fiscal sanctions.
22 45 C.F.R. § 205.40(a) (1975).
23 Id. § 205.40(a)(7).
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amendments or regulations into effect without having assistance
payments based on the new rules classified as case errors.2 4
Anticipating the impact of cutbacks in federal funding for ad-
ministrative errors in excess of the tolerance levels, some states have
attempted to impose full financial responsibility for case errors on
the local agencies actually making the eligibility and payment deci-
sions. California, for example, instituted a practice of requiring its
counties to reimburse the state for the percentage of state and
federal contributions lost to erroneous welfare payments. 25 The
extent of the states' power to fix responsibility for case errors upon
local governments, in an attempt to increase the accuracy of ad-
ministrative decisibns, is an unresolved question which promises to
receive increased attention as the full quality control penalties be-
come operative in 1976. To date, County of Marin v. Martin26 is the
only reported case to directly address this issue. In County of Marin, a
California state court, construing the federal regulations as well as
state law to place "at least a substantial part of blame for the adminis-
trative errors at issue"27 upon the state, rejected the state's attempt
to shift the responsibility for erroneous payments to the county
welfare agencies. The court, however, reserved the question of
whether the responsibility for improper welfare payments could be
apportioned in a reasonable and equitable manner among federal,
state, and local agencies. 28
II
DISALLOWANCE PROCEDURES
Under the Social Security Act, states wishing to participate in
the federal AFDC program must submit a plan to the Secretary of
HEW for approval. 29 Once approved, federal funds are furnished
until the state plan is formally disapproved. 30 If at any point its plan
24 Id.; 40 Fed. Reg. 32,955 (1975). If the proposals are not approved by HEW, the federal
government follows its normal practice of withholding its share of the payments made under
the proposals.
25 See County of Matin v. Martin, 43 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6-7, 117 Cal. Rptr. 364, 368 (Ist Dist.
1974).
26 43 Cal. App. 3d 1, 117 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Ist Dist. 1974).
21 Id. at 8, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 369. The court relied on 45 C.F.R. § 201.10(b) (1975)
(requiring states to carry out an approved quality control program), and id. §§ 205.200-.202
(requiring states to fix standards for employment, training, and conduct of local personnel).
28 43 Cal. App. 3d at 10, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
29 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970); 45 C.F.R. § 201.3 (1975).
30 42 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1970). Federal regulations require each state to submit all relevant
changes in its AFDC program to HEW for review. 45 C.F.R. § 201.3(f) (1975).
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is disapproved, a state is given notice of alleged noncompliance with
minimum federal standards and an opportunity for a hearing.31
Federal funds are discontinued if after notice and hearing the state
plan is found not to conform to federal requirements.3 2 The ad-
ministrative procedures to which a state is entitled before federal
funding is cut off are outlined in the Social Security Act 33 and in
regulations promulgated by HEW.34
Federal funding under approved state plans is not, however,
unrestricted. Fiscal sanctions are imposed by several provisions of
the Act35 and by HEW36 for a state's failure to satisfy specific federal
requirements. Designed to provide incentives for complying with
these requirements while avoiding the harsh result of cutting off
federal funds entirely, these penalty provisions reduce the amount
of federal reimbursement that noncomplying states may claim. 37 For
example, as of January 1, 1977, a state may lose five percent of its
federal AFDC subsidy for failing to maintain an effective program
for child support.38 And under the quality control program, states
with positive error rates exceeding the tolerance levels established by
HEW are subject to financial penalties. 39
Since reducing federal funding to force states to comply with
federal requirements is a relatively new development in the AFDC
program, there is no statutory requirement for notice and hearing
in cases where the federal share of AFDC payments is reduced,
rather than terminated. 40 In 1975, administrative procedures for
reconsidering federal reductions were formalized for the first time
by HEW.41
31 42 U.S.C. §§ 604(a), 1316(a) (1970).
32 Id. Only once has HEW actually withheld federal funds from a state after a formal
hearing. Because the sanction is drastic, the agency is extremely reluctant to exercise its power.
Instead, HEW usually attempts to secure compliance through informal negotiations. See
Rosaldo v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 426 (1970) (concurring opinion, Douglas, J.); G. COOPER &
P. DODYK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INCOME MAINTENANCE 343, 352 (2d ed. 1973).
33 42 U.S.C. § 604(a) (1970).
34 45 C.F.R. § 213 (1975).
35 In addition to the reduction provisions for child support and quality control programs
(see notes 38-39 and accompanying text infra), the federal share of AFDC payments may be
reduced for failure to certify to the local employment office at least 15% of the Work Incentive
Program registrants (42 U.S.C. § 603(c) (1970)), for failure to provide family planning services
to AFDC recipients (42 U.S.C. § 603(f) (Supp. IV, 1974)), and for failure to furnish child
health screening and corrective treatment services (id. § 603(g)).
36 45 C.F.R. §§ 205.41(b)-(c) (1975).
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 603 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1974); 45 C.F.R. §§ 205.41(b)-(c) (1975).
38 42 U.S.C. § 603(h) (Supp. IV, 1974). See note 164 and accompanying text infra.
39 45 C.F.R. §§ 205.41(b)-(c) (1975).
40 See 42 U.S.C. § 1316(d) (1970).
41 45 C.F.R. § 201.14 (1975). The new procedures apply to any reduction in federal
19761
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Under the new reconsideration procedures, a state whose claim
for federal funds is partially denied by the Regional Commissioner
of the Social and Rehabilitation Service (SRS) is issued a disallow-
ance letter, explaining in detail the reasons for the reduction and the
evidence used to reach the decision. 42 If the state is dissatisfied with
the reduction in its grant, it may request reconsideration -from the
Administrator of SRS.45 The Regional Commissioner forwards a
record of all material bearing on the reconsideration to the Adminis-
trator, who in turn informs the state of all items in the record.4 The
state may submit additional written evidence and arguments in
support of its request for reconsideration,45 and may obtain an
informal conference with the Administrator to explain its position. 46
If the Administrator requests additional information or documents,
these materials are made available to the state.47 All of the docu-
ments, correspondence, and other materials constitute the record of
the reconsideration proceedings, 48 upon which the Administrator's
final decision is based.4 9
The procedures for reconsidering disallowances are less exact-
ing than the procedures for discontinuing federal funds entirely.50
Formal adjudicatory proceedings, including the opportunity to con-
front and cross-examine witnesses and present oral argument, are
not available to states contesting reductions. 51 Doubts have been
expressed as to whether the new procedures comport with the due
process clause; 52 at this point, the issue remains unresolved.
funding authorized by §§ 3, 403, 422, 455, 603, 1003, 1403, 1603, 1903, or 2003 of the Social
Security Act. Id. It is not clear whether the new procedures will also be applied to reductions
under the quality control program. See id. § 205.41(b)-(c) (1975); note 16 and accompanying
text supra.
42 45 C.F.R. § 201.14(b) (1975).
43 Id. § 201.14(c).
44 Id. §§ 201.14(d)(2)-(3).
45 Id. § 201.14(d)(4).
46 Id. § 201.14(d)(7).
47 Id. § 201.14(d)(9).
48 Id. § 201.14(d)(10).
49 Id. § 201.14(d)(1 1). According to HEW, a state may obtain judicial review of the
Administrator's decision in the United States Courts of Appeals pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1316(3)-(4) (1970). See 40 Fed. Reg. 34,597 (1975).
50 Compare 45 C.F.R. § 213 (1975) (conformity hearing procedures) with 45 C.F.R.
§ 201.14 (1975) (procedures for reconsidering reductions in federal funding).
51 See 45 C.F.R. § 201.14 (1975).
52 It was argued when the regulation was proposed that the due process clause requires
additional procedures, such as the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and engage
in formal oral arguments. 40 Fed. Reg. 34,597 (1975).
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III
ELIGIBILITY CONDITIONS RELATED TO NEED
A. Federal Control Over Need and Amount of Assistance
In determining whether a household is financially eligible for
AFDC, and, if so, how much it should receive, a state must take into
consideration all of the household's currently available income and
resources, unless the income or resource is expressly exempted by
federal law. 53 One such exemption is the reserve rule.54 That provi-
sion permits states to exclude some of the applicant's resources in
determining need, thus allowing individuals to qualify for assistance
while retaining minimal assets. 55
Until 1975, federal control over the amount and type of re-
sources that AFDC recipients could reserve was minimal. This was in
keeping with the well-established federal policy of leaving determi-
nations of need and amount of assistance to the individual states.56
The applicable regulation simply provided that in addition to the
home, personal effects, automobile, and income-producing prop-
erty allowed by the state, the resources reserved to meet the house-
hold's current and future needs could not exceed a value of $2,000
per individual.5 7
In 1975, HEW promulgated a more detailed resource regula-
ion, intended to make major changes in the resource limit for
AFDC recipients and decrease state discretion in determining who is
53 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(7), (a)(8)(B)(i) (1970); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii) (1975). The
household's nonexempt or "countable" income may not exceed the "standard of need"
defined by the state. The standard of need represents the amounts needed to purchase basic
maintenance items, such as food, shelter, utilities, clothing, and furniture, and typically varies
with the number of persons in the household, number of rooms occupied, and other factors.
In general, AFDC benefits are computed by comparing the household's total nonexempt
income and resources to the state's standard of need; all or part of the difference is paid to the
household. See generally HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 145-47, 149-51, 161-63; G. COOPER & P.
DODYK, supra note 32, at 259-60.
54 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(B)(i) (1970); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(i) (1975).
55 Such a reserve is exempt, having no effect on the individual's eligibility for AFDC or
his payment level. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(i) (1975).
11 See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1968). Although states exercise considerable
discretion in defining need, federal regulations place some limitations on that discretion. See,
e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 233.20 (1975).
57 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(i) (1974) (repealed). The states vary considerably in the extent
to which and the conditions under which the home, automobiles, insurance, income-
producing property, and other real and personal property may be held by AFDC recipients.
See HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 146-47, 158-59.
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needy.5" The federal ceiling on the amount of personal property
that may be reserved dropped by almost one-fourth to $2,250 for a
family of four, with an additional one hundred dollars for each
additional eligible individual. 59 Market values must be attached to
personal effects and income-producing property and counted
against the reserve ceiling.60 The items excluded from the personal
property reserve are limited to the reasonable value of a home,
wedding and engagement rings, heirlooms, car of limited value, and
equipment and material necessary for employment or rehabilita-
tion. 61 For the first time, a ceiling of $1,200 is placed on the value of
an automobile needed for employment or training; if its retail value
exceeds $1,200, the excess value is counted against the personal
property reserve.62
Essentially two reasons were given by HEW for the more restric-
tive controls over the resource reserve.63 First and foremost was the
desire to reduce welfare expenditures by implementing a more
58 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(i) (1975).
59 Id.
60 Id. The new regulation greatly increases the number of property appraisals that
caseworkers must undertake. Not only must previously exempt personal effects, income-
producing property, and automobiles be evaluated, but the home must be appraised to
determine whether it exceeds a "reasonable value." Id. In response to criticism that the new
regulation imposes an undue burden on local welfare agencies, HEW stated:
[The] problem of property valuation cannot be avoided in any system that seeks to
separate those who are truly needy from those who are not. The problems of
valuation are, indeed difficult ones, but they are problems which are inherent in our
present system of welfare.
40 Fed. Reg. 30,965 (1975).
Whether or not a given home has a reasonable value promises to be a difficult question.
HEW's comments on the regulation afford some assistance in defining standards for ascertain-
ing the reasonable value of a home:
A "reasonable value" would be one which prevents a public assistance recipient from
owning a home of such high value that payments, taxes, maintenance, etc., would
absorb a disproportionate amount of the assistance grant or which represents a large
equity that could be used for living expenses. At the same time, the reasonable value
would not be so low that it would increase the recipients' cost for necessary housing.
Id. at 30,964.
61 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(i) (1975). Much more was excluded under the prior regula-
tion. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
62 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(i) (1975). Although HEW has never attempted to define
"income" or "resources," some guidance was given in the requirement that income and
resources could not be considered in determining AFDC eligibility or amount of payments
unless "currently available." 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii) (1974) (repealed).
The new regulation relaxes this requirement. Income and resources are to be considered
available "both when actually available and when the applicant or recipient has a legal interest
in a liquidated sum and has the legal ability to make such sum available for support and
maintenance ...." 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1975).
61 40 Fed. Reg. 30,963 (1975). Although other reasons were given, they all amount to the
two outlined in the text accompanying notes 64-65 infra.
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stringent asset test.64 Second was the desire to promote public
confidence in the welfare system by ensuring that some distinction
would continue to exist between AFDC recipients and the working
public and by preventing AFDC households from acquiring or
maintaining unnecessary items at the public expense.65
The regulation also provides that "[real and personal property
shall be valued at their gross market value including encum-
brances[,]" rather than at the resale value of the property to the
individual. 66 In response to sharp criticism of the decision to depart
from the former rule of equity valuation, 67 the following justifica-
tion was given:
Although excluding encumbrances has the possible effect of hid-
ing the amount of cash that an individual could receive if he sold
the item it nonetheless serves the justifiable purpose of deterring
the recipient from possessing encumbered items which place a
drain on his limited budget. Large monthly payments on encum-
brances are counterproductive to the goal of making the recipient
independent of the welfare system, and results [sic] in funds pro-
vided for basic necessities being diverted to meet payments on
non-essential amenities. 6
The new regulation was scheduled to go into effect on June 17,
1975.69 On June 16, however, a federal district court in National
Welfare Rights Organization v. Weinberger70 issued a temporary re-
straining order enjoining its enforcement pending a hearing on its
validity. 71 Among other arguments, the plaintiffs asserted that the
Social Security Act gives the states, not the federal government, the
64 40 Fed. Reg. 30,963 (1975).
65 Id.
66 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(i) (1975).
67 The provision has been condemned as being unjust and inconsistent with both the
Social Security Act and federal regulations. See 40 Fed. Reg. 12,507, 30,964 (1975); Brief for
Appellants at 18-2 1, National Welfare Rights Org. v. Mathews, No. 75-1741 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 20,
1976) (on file at the Cornell Law Review); notes 72-73 infra.
68 40 Fed. Reg. 30,964 (1975). The argument that AFDC recipients with heavily encum-
bered property are less likely to achieve independence from the welfare system has little merit.
In determining benefit levels, indebtedness is not deducted. The only difference between
recipients who have purchased items on credit and those who have not is that the latter will not
be obligated to allocate a significant portion of their assistance checks toward the payment of
bills and therefore will have more cash on hand to spend on daily maintenance needs, such as
food and clothing, if they choose. Whether or not this difference alone increases the likelihood
of independence is highly questionable.
69 Id. at 12,508.
70 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 225 (D.D.C. June 16, 1975). After the temporary restraining
order was issued, the regulation was republished in the Federal Register with further explana-
tion of its purpose and effect. 40 Fed. Reg. 30,963 (1975).
71 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 225 (D.D.C. June 16, 1975).
1976]
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exclusive power to set resource limits7 2 and prohibits gross market
valuation without regard to encumbrances.7 3 The plaintiffs' argu-
ments were rejected by the district court in August. 74 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld- the
power of the federal government to establish resource limits, but
declared the fair market value rule to be inconsistent with the Social
Security Act, and struck down the regulation for failing to comply
with the Administrative Procedure Act. 75
B. Countable Income
1. Benefits From Other Assistance Programs
A large number of households receiving AFDC benefits include
at least one individual receiving benefits from another assistance
program, 6 such as Social Security or the Supplemental Security
Income Program (SSI). The question has frequently arisen in recent
72 Id.; Brief for Appellants, supra note 67, at 14-17. When the Social §ecurity Act was first
proposed in 1935, attempts to set federal standards of eligibility pqd benefit levels were
rejected. The determination of need for AFDC purposes was intentionally left to the states.
H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1935); S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 36
(1935). This position was reaffirmed in 1939, with specific reference to resource reserves. See
84 CONG. REc. 6704, 6924 (1939). And it has not changed in recent years. See S. REP. No. 1230,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. 478 (1972). Although HEW has regulated state practice to a certain extent
in areas related to need (see, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 233.20(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)(ii), (a)(3)(iv), 233.90(a)
(1975)), it has never attempted to establish a standard relating to need determinations as
narrow and specific as the new resource regulation. This regulation, it was argued, impernjii-
sibly intrudes upon a well-established area of state discretion. Brief for Appellants, supra note
67, at 17.
73 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 225 (D.D.C. June 16, 1975); Brief for Appelltnts, supra nQtr
67, at 18-21. Section 402(a)(7) of the Social Security Act requires each state "in determining yfq
[to] take into consideration any other income and resources" of AFDC applicants. 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(7) (1970) (emphasis added). Whether or not an individual is needy depends upon his
ability to purchase daily maintenance items; the value of his property is relevant only to the
extent that it can be converted into cash to meet financial needs. The case law provides strong
support for this interpretaion of the statute. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 67, at 20-21.
Although discouraging welfare recipients from acquiring heavily encumbered assets may be a
worthwhile goal, it should not be achieved by manipulating the reserve rule in a way that is not
authorized by the statute.
Appellants also pointed out that the new resource valuation rule was inconsistent with thp
requirement that only actually available income and resources be considered in determining
need, this requirement being continued in the challenged regulation. 45 C.F.R. §
233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1975); Brief for Appellants, supra note 67, at 19-20.
" The court concluded that the regulation was authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 1302
(1970), giving HEW the power to promulgate regulations implementing certain provisions of
the Social Security Act. 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 596 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 1975).
r National Welfare Rights Org. v. Mathews, No. 75-0956 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 20, 1976).
76 Between 60% and 75% of households on any form of assistance receive benefits from
more than one program. STAFF OFJOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 93D CONG., ISTSESs., How PUBLIC
WELFARE BENEFITS ARE DISTRIBUTED IN Low INCOME AREAS 2 (Comm. Print. 1973).
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years whether such non-AFDC income should be taken into account
when calculating a household's AFDC benefit level. 7 7 A number of
states have assumed that such income is available to meet the needs
of other members of the household and have reduced AFDC grants
accordingly. 78
A Connecticut regulation, for example, provided that Social
Security benefits received by a mother as representative payee for
her children could be included as income to the mother to the extent
that the Social Security benefits exceeded the budgeted needs of the
children under AFDC.79 Although the Social Security regulations
allow the representative payee to use part of the benefits for his own
support if the needs of the child have been met,8 0 the courts have
held that states cannot assume that such income is in fact available to
meet the needs of the parent or the rest of the household. 81 The
parent has the option of removing the child from the assistance unit.
The child's needs will thereby not be considered in calculating the
AFDC unit's benefits -and the child's Social Security income will be
completely disregarded, unless it is actually being used to support
other household members. 82
When an individual receiving benefits from another assistance
program is removed from the AFDC unit, there are two possible
77 See notes 81, 85-97 and accompanying text infra.
7' See, e.g., CAL. ELIGIBILITY AND ASSISTANCE STANDARDS § 44-115.8, quoted in Cooper v.
Carleson, 107 Cal. Rptr. 502, 504 n.1 (1973); S. DAK. DEP'T OF WELFARE REGS. § III-5A-19,
quoted in Howard v. Madigan, 363 F. Supp. 351, 353 (D.S.D. 1973).
79 CONN. WELFARE MANUAL REGS. § 335.16(VI), quoted in Johnson v. Harder, 383 F. Supp.
174, 177 n.4 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 1188 (2d Cir. 1975).
80 20 C.F.R. § 404.1607 (1975) provides:
If current maintenance needs of a beneficiary [of OASDI] are being reasonably
met, a relative or other person to whom payments are certified as representative
payee on behalf of the beneficiary may use part of the payments so certified for the
support of the legally dependent spouse, a legally dependent child, or a legally
dependent parent of the beneficiary.
The regulation is part of a group of regulations setting forth the fiduciary duties of a
representative payee. Id. §§ 404.1601-.1610 (1975). The representative payee is required to
use the benefits "only for the use and benefit of such beneficiary in the manner and for the
purposes determined by him to be in the beneficiary's best interest." Id. § 404.1603 (1975).
81 Johnson v. Harder, 383 F. Supp. 174 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 1188 (2d Cir.
1975); Howard v. Madigan, 363 F. Supp. 351 (D.S.D. 1973).
82 Johnson v. Harder, 383 F. Supp. 174 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 1188 (2d Cir.
1975); Howard v. Madigan, 363 F. Supp. 351 (D.S.D. 1973). The cases have adopted the
approach endorsed by John L. Costa, Commissioner of the Social and Rehabilitative Service,
in State Letter No. 1088, Sept. 25, 1970, quoted in 383 F. Supp. at 180:
In view of the statutory requirement that a child's OASDI benefits be for his "use and
benefit" alone, the representative payee may not be required to use such benefits for
other members of the child's family. Thus, if a child's monthly OASDI benefit
exceeds his AFDC payment, the payee must have the option of removing the child
together with his income from the AFDC family budget unit.
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methods of determining the AFDC unit's benefit level. Either the
AFDC unit's benefits can be calculated as a prorated share of the
payments the entire household would receive if all of its members
were included within the AFDC unit, or the AFDC unit can be
treated as a separate household with no non-AFDC recipient resid-
ing in the home. Many states, recognizing the economies of scale, do
not increase benefits proportionately when the size of the household
increases.8 3 In these states, the amount of the AFDC unit's benefits
will be adversely affected if the unit's benefits are prorated rather
than calculated as a separate household.8 4
In Nelson v. Likins,8 5 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed a district court decision8 6 that had preliminarily enjoined
Minnesota's practice of prorating the needs of AFDC beneficiaries
where a non-AFDC recipient receiving SSI benefits resided in the
household. 87 The court held that the AFDC unit must receive the
same benefits that would be received by a similarly sized AFDC unit
that was not sharing its household with a non-AFDC recipient.88
The court based its decision on a provision of the Social Security Act
requiring payments to SSI recipients to be disregarded in determin-
ing AFDC benefits.89 It rejected the economies of scale argument for
prorating allowances on the ground that the argument assumed the
non-AFDC recipient actually paid his share of the household's ex-
penses, the assumption itself being in violation of the statute. 90
83 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 11450 (West 1972); N.Y. Soc. SEgv. LAw § 131-a(3)
(McKinney 1976).
84 In New York, for example, a two-person AFDC household with no income receives
$150 per month as a basic allowance, excluding housing costs and special items of need. A
three-person household receives $200. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131-a(3) (McKinney Supp.
1976). If one of the three is dropped from the AFDC unit and the remaining individuals'
needs are prorated, the unit's grant for basic needs will amount to $133. But if the two
AFDC recipients are treated as a two-person household, they will receive $150 for their
basic needs.
85 510 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1975) (mem.).
86 Nelson v. Likins, 389 F. Supp. 1234 (D. Minn. 1974), affd, 510 F.2d 414 (1975).
87 In Nelson, one of the plaintiff's sons was too old to receive AFDC but due to a physical
impairment received SSI benefits. Id. at 1236.
88 Id. at 1238-39.
89 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(24) (Supp. IV, 1974) requires a state AFDC plan to provide:
[Ihf an individual is receiving benefits under subchapter XVI of this chapter [SSI],
then, for the period for which such benefits are received, such individual shall not be
regarded as a member of a family for purposes of determining the amount of the
benefits of the family under this subchapter and his income and resources shall not
be counted as income and resources of a family under this subchapter ....
42 U.S.C. § 1382a(a)(2)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974) requires reductions in SSI grants where the
recipient resides in the household of another.
10 389 F. Supp. 1234, 1238-39 (D. Minn. 1974). See also Barton v. Fahey, 2 CCH Pov. L.
REP. 19,707 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1974); Barton v. Lavine, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 20,448 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y.), aff'd, 46 App. Div. 2d 981, 363 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1974).
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Although federal regulations require Social Security benefits to
be included as countable income to the beneficiary in determining
the beneficiary's eligibility for and amount of AFDC assistance, 91 a
federal district court recently departed from this provision in a case
where the plaintiffs' entitlement to Social Security benefits was based
on their enrollment as full-time college students under age twenty-
two. 2 In Elam v. Hanson,93 the plaintiffs were unmarried mothers
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two who were receiving
Social Security benefits as children of their fathers.9 4 In processing
their applications for AFDC, the Ohio Department of Public Wel-
fare treated their Social Security benefits as available income. The
court, finding that the purpose of Social Security student benefits is
to provide an education for the recipients rather than to assist in the
care of dependent children, 95 concluded that the families' AFDC
grants could not be reduced as a result of their receipt of Social
Security.96 Reasoning that the two programs are designed to meet
The Social Security Act does not specify how benefits other than SSI should be treated
when received by an AFDC household. Although the Nelson decision was based on the
language of the Social Security Act, its rationale applies to other types of benefits as well, e.g.,
Social Security, at least where the non-AFDC recipient has no obligation to support other
members of the household. According to Nelson, since the prorating of household expenses
assumes that the non-AFDC recipient actually pays his share of the household's expenses, and
since states are not allowed to assume that non-AFDC assistance is available to other members
of the household (see notes 81-82 and accompanying text supra), the prorating of expenses in
shared households is impermissible under the Nelson rationale regardless of the source of
non-AFDC benefits. This analysis is consistent with Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975),
which prohibits the prorating of shelter allowances where a nonlegally responsible individual
resides in the AFDC household, unless the lodger actually contributes to the household's
needs.
91 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(4)(i) (1975) provides that in determining an individual's need
and amount of assistance "[a]ll income must be included such as social security .
92 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(B)(i) (1970).
93 384 F. Supp. 549 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
91 Id. at 550. Although Social Security children's benefits normally terminate when the
child reaches age 18 (42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(B)(i) (1970)), the plaintiffs' benefits were continued
because of their status as full-time college students.
' 384 F. Supp. at 552. The court reasoned that the two programs were not duplicative.
See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(vii) (1975).
96 In this case, the Court does not believe that Congress could have intended by
one project to aid OASDI [Social Security] recipients who desire education by provid-
ing benefits while they pursue a full-time course of study and then by another
program to reduce the amount of benefits paid on behalf of dependent children of
that OASDI recipient. It amounts to the federal government holding out a promise
of aid for education with one hand and at the same time with the other hand having
the state government, spurred by federal regulations, destroying that promise of aid.
The Court finds that Congress has provided two assistance programs aimed at two
distinct needs. Assistance for the one need, maintaining the family unit where one
parent is unmarried, should not be reduced because a separate need of that parent
for education is also present at the same time.
384 F. Supp. at 553.
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two distinct needs, education and maintenance of the family unit,
the court held that the plaintiffs' Social Security payments must be
totally disregarded in determining their eligibility for and the
amount of their AFDC benefits.
97
2. Tax Refunds
Whether tax refunds should be classified as countable in-
come, exempt income, or resources, is a question that has recently
troubled a number of courts. 98 Its resolution is significant for the
employed AFDC recipient. If tax refunds are treated as countable
unearned income, the recipient's grant will in most states be subject
to a dollar for dollar reduction for the month in which the tax
refund is received. 99 If instead the tax refunds are classified as
earned income, the first thirty dollars of the refund plus one-third
of the remainder will be exempted from the recipient's countable
income and will not be used to reduce his AFDC grant.100 A third
17 Id. The court's holding is not only inconsistent with federal regulations (see note 91 and
accompanying text supra), but is premised on a highly questionable interpretation of the
purpose of a student's Social Security benefits. Old age and survivors' benefits were designed
to enable the beneficiary to meet his basic maintenance expenses by replacing the income of a
deceased or retired wage earner on whom the beneficiary was dependent. Delnov v. Celebrezze,
347 F.2d 159, 161 (9th Cir. 1965); Garner v. Richardson, 333 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (N.D. Cal.
1971). Children's benefits are no exception; their purpose is "to provide at least some measure
of income and security to those who have lost a wage-earner on whom they depended." Davis
v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588, 593 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972). Congress has at
times extended the coverage of Old Age and Survivors Insurance with the express purpose of
reducing the cost of public assistance. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1669, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950).
This assumes that Social Security beneficiaries will either be rendered ineligible for public
assistance or have their grants reduced.
Student's benefits, introduced in 1965, merely represent an extension of the period of
dependency from age 18 to 22 if the child is in school. Their purpose is no different from that
of children's benefits: to replace the income of a deceased wage earner upon whom the child
depends for support. See S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 96-97 (1965). AFDC is
similarly designed to meet basic maintenance needs. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
Since the court in Elam misconstrued the purpose of student benefits and therefore
concluded that the two programs were not duplicative, it is unlikely that the case will be
followed by other courts.
58 See notes 107-15 and accompanying text infra.
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1970); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii) (1975). Those states that
do not pay AFDC recipients their full standard of need have the option of subtracting
countable income from either the state's standard of need or its payment level. 45 C.F.R.
§ 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(B) (1975). See also Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972). In the states
that subtract countable income from the standard of need before applying the reduction
factor, each dollar added to the recipient's countable income will not result in a dollar-for-
dollar reduction in his grant; rather, for every additional dollar added, the grant will be
reduced by some amount less than a dollar, depending on the state's percentage reduction
factor. For an illustration of the difference between the two systems see id. at 539-40 n.6;
HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 161-63.
" o See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(ii) (1970); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(11)(ii)(b) (1975); note 131
and accompanying text infra.
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possibility, at least until recently, 1 1 is that tax refunds will be treated
as income, but income that is exempt. A tax refund under this
-possibility would have no effect on the recipient's grant.
Until recently, federal regulations provided that "only such net
income as is actually available for current use on a regular basis"
could be considered by the state in establishing financial eligibility
for AFDC and the amount of the assistance payment. 0 2 Since tax
refunds are received only once a year, there was some question
whether they were available "on a regular basis" and therefore
countable. 0 3 On the other hand, if tax refunds are treated as re-
sources, which need only be "currently available,"' 0 4 in most states
the recipient will be entitled to apply the refund toward his individ-
ual personal property reserve.' 0 5 So long as the ceiling' 0 6 on the
reserve is not exceeded, the refund will have no effect on the
recipient's grant.
The courts are split on the proper classification of tax refunds.
In Kaisa v. Chang, 107 a federal district court held that tax refunds
are not available on a regular basis, and therefore must be treated
as resources, subject to exemption by applying the funds toward the
individual resource reserve. 08 In Walker v. Juras,10 9 on the other
hand, the Oregon Court of Appeals determined that the possibility
of receiving tax refunds annually constitutes sufficient regularity to
101 See text accompanyihg note 126 infra.
102 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(C) (1974) (repealed in 1975 and replaced by id. § 233.-
20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1975)).
103 See notes 107-11 and accompanying text infra.
104 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1975).
15 See notes 53-57 and accompanying text supra. Only a few states, including New York,
do not allow AFDC recipients to reserve resources for future needs. See 18 NYCRR §§ 352.11
(Oct. 31, 1974), .15 (June 30, 1975), .22 (July 31, 1973), .23 (March 31, 1975), .24-.28 (Sept.
30, 1975); HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 158-59.
106 According to federal regulations, state ceilings on resource reserves may not exceed
$2,250 for a family of four, with an additional $100 for each additional eligible individual. 45
C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(1) (1975); See notes 58-75 and accompanying text supra.
107 396 F. Supp. 375 (D. Hawaii 1975).
108 Id. See also County of Alameda v. Carleson, 5 Cal. 3d 730, 749, 488 P.2d 953, 966, 97
Cal. Rptr. 385, 398 (1971), appeal dismissed, 406 U.S. 913 (1972).
The Hawaii court interpreted the regulation limiting countable income to "net income
[that] is actually available for current use on a regular basis" (45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c)
(1974) as establishing three independent tests that must be satisfied before tax refunds could
be classified as income to the recipient: refunds must be (1) actually available, (2) for current
use, (3) on a regular basis. 396 F. Supp. at 377. Although the state welfare agency failed to
argue that refunds were available on a regular basis, arguing instead that regularity of receipt
was not required, the court noted that "[g]iven the uncertainty of receiving any tax refund and
the fact that even if received, it can be expected, at most, once annually, such an argument
would be unpersuasive." Id., n.13.
109 16 Ore. App. 295, 518 P.2d 663 (1974).
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satisfy the regular basis test. 110 The court held that refunds should
therefore be treated as countable income and used to reduce the
recipient's grant."'
The only court that has considered the argument that tax re-
funds should be classified as earned income, subject to the thirty
dollars plus one-third disregard, flatly rejected it." 2 In Richards v.
Lavine, " 3 the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
held that tax refunds attributable to imprecisions in the tax liability
projection method used by employers must be treated as resources.
And since New York is one of the few states that does not allow
recipients to accumulate a resource reserve, 1 4 the refunds directly
reduce the size of AFDC grants. 115
Although the courts have attached different labels to tax re-
funds, the rationale underlying at least two of the above decisions
has been to avoid duplicating assistance grants." 6 In Walker, the
court expressed concern that AFDC recipients would elect to claim
fewer dependents than they are entitled to claim, thereby decreas-
ing their net income during the taxable year and increasing their
assistance grants."17 Implicit in the court's opinion is an intent to
prevent windfalls: if such tax refunds are not used to reduce the
grant in the following year, recipients claiming fewer dependents
will receive higher total payments over the two years than similarly
situated recipients claiming the full number of dependents.1 8
The court in Richards expressly stated that its decision to treat
no Id. at 298, 518 P.2d at 665. The court did not even consider whether the tax refunds
were resources rather than income; the issue framed by the court was simply whether the
refunds were countable or exempt income. Id. at 297, 518 P.2d at 664.
111 Id. at 298, 518 P.2d at 665.
112 Richards v. Lavine, 48 App. Div. 2d 204, 369 N.Y.S.2d 31 (3d Dep't 1975). See
language quoted in text accompanying note 121 infra. The opinion contains no discussion of
the question of regular availability.
'" 48 App. Div. 2d 204, 369 N.Y.S. 2d 31 (3d Dep't 1975).
114 Although the state does allow recipients to retain such resources as a home, a car
necessary for transportation, and personal effects, there is no provision for setting aside real
or personal property for present or future use. 18 NYCRR §§ 352.11 (Oct. 31, 1975), .15
(June 30, 1975), .22 (July 31, 1973), .23 (Mar. 31, 1975), .24-.28 (Sept. 30, 1975).
'" 48 App. Div. 2d at 205, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 32.
116 See Richards v. Lavine, 48 App. Div. 2d 204, 206, 369 N.Y.S.2d 31, 33 (3d Dep't
1975); Walker v. Juras, 16 Ore. App. 295, 297-98, 518.P.2d 663, 664-65 (1974). In Kaisa, the
court focused exclusively on the question of whether tax refunds were available on a regular
basis. It is not clear from the facts given whether the court's decision allows duplications in
AFDC grants. 396 F. Supp. 375 (D. Hawaii 1975).
1 16 Ore. App. at 297-98, 518 P.2d at 664-65.
"s This argument assumes that grants are calculated on the basis of the number of
exemptions actually claimed by the recipient, rather than the maximum number of exemp-
tions that the recipient is entitled to claim. See id. at 298 n.2, 518 P.2d at 665 n.2.
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the tax refunds as non-exempt resources was designed to avoid
duplications of assistance grants." 9 Since New York calculates
AFDC grants on the basis of the recipient's projected tax liability
with maximum exemptions, 120 any refund due to imperfect projec-
tions, and not to the difference between the number of exemptions
claimed by the recipient and the maximum number of exemptions
for which he was credited, will be used to reduce the recipient's
grant; otherwise, the recipient is not placed in the same position as
similarly situated individuals whose projections were accurate. In
explaining why such refunds should be used to reduce the recip-
ient's grant, dollar for dollar, rather than be treated as earned
income, the court stated:
Although the original source of these sums was wages or salaries,
these amounts were withheld from the paychecks of petitioners
who, in turn, were immediately reimbursed therefor by increases
in their assistance grants from the department. Accordingly, these
portions of the refunds are actually duplications of sums already
paid to petitioners, and, as such, they amount to windfalls for
which petitioners have incurred no expense other than those
which have been considered in determining the size of their...
grants. 121
As a result of New York's practice of crediting AFDC recipients with
the maximum number of exemptions in calculating grants, refunds
due to claiming fewer than the maximum number of exemptions, on
the other hand, do not constitute duplications and therefore are not,
as the court acknowledged, 22 countable income or resources in New
York.' 23
Whether tax refunds constitute duplications of grants already
received will probably continue to be a determinative question when
courts classify tax refunds as income or resources. Because this
question depends on how the state initially computes the recipient's
tax liability in determining his net income for AFDC purposes, 24
the courts cannot be expected to agree upon the correct classifica-
119 48 App. Div. 2d at 206, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 33.
120 See id. at 205, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 32-33; letter from Abe Lavine, Commissioner of N.Y.
State Dep't of Social Services, to County Dep't of Social Services, Transmittal No. 75 ADM-35,
Apr. 18, 1975.
121 48 App. Div. 2d at 206, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 33.
122 Id. at 205, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 32-33.
1'23 See id.; letter from Abe Lavine, supra note 120.
124 Compare, for example, the practice in New York of crediting AFDC recipients with
the maximum number of dependency exemptions to which they are entitled, with the more
common practice of subtracting taxes from the recipient's gross income based on the number
of exemptions actually claimed.
1976]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:777
tion of tax refunds. On the other hand, whether tax refunds are
available on a regular basis, formerly a prerequisite to their treat-
ment as countable income,1 25 has become a moot question under a
new federal regulation, effectiveJune 17, 1975, which merely requires
that net income be "available for current use" for it to be count-
able.1 2 6 The court's decision in Kaisa, 1 27 which held that tax refunds
are not regularly available and therefore to be treated as resources
rather than as countable income, 1 28 may no longer be valid. 12 9
3. Public Service Employment Income
In order to increase the work incentive for welfare recipients,
in 1967 Congress amended the Social Security Act to require that
states disregard the first thirty dollars of an AFDC family's earnings
and one-third of the remainder each month in determining the
amount of payments to which the AFDC family is entitled. 30 As a
result, families with earned income receive a higher total income
(including AFDC) than families without earned income.' 3' This
disregard, however, applies only to AFDC recipients employed in
the regular economy.132 As part of the Work Incentive Program
(WIN) enacted in 1967,133 Congress provided for the establishment
of special work projects, designed for AFDC recipients for whom
jobs in the regular economy were not available.1 34 Placements were
125 See 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(c) (1974) (repealed); notes 107-11 and accompanying
text .upra.
1' 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D) (1975). See note 62 supra.
127 396 F. Supp. 375 (D. Hawaii 1975).
128 Id. at 378.
129 Note, however, that the regulation governing attribution of a lodger's income to the
AFDC unit continues to require that "only such net income as is actually available for current
use on a regular basis will be considered .... in determining AFDC financial eligibility and
the amount ofthe assistance payment. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(a) (1975). This regulation, entitled
Fators .pecific to AFDC, may be read by the courts as controlling all questions of countable
income in the context of AFDC.
"' 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(ii) (1970). Prior to the 1967 amendments, the income of
AFDC families was disregarded only in a few limited circumstances. See Lurie,supm note 12, at
835.
1:11 For example, suppose a family of four with no income receives a monthly AFDC
allowance of $250. If one of the household members begins earning $90 a month, $50 (i.e.,
S30 plus one-third of the remainder) will be disregarded in calculating the family's new
monthly allowance. The family's grant will therefore be reduced by $40 to $210 in most states
(we notes 53, 99 and accompanying text supra), but the family's total income (AFDC plus
earnings) will rise to $300, rather than remain at the previous level of $250.
1:12 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(ii) (1970) expressly exempts from operation of the $30 and
one-third disregard income derived from special job training or public service programs.
'*1 For a discussion of the WI N program, see notes 266-69 and accompanying text infra.
1:14 42 U.S.C. §§ 632(b)(3), 633(e) (1970).
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to be made with public agencies and certain nonprofit organizations,
and participants were to perform useful work that would not oth-
erwise be performed by regular employees. 135 Income derived from
participation in a special work project became subject to a twenty
percent disregard. 136
In 1971, Congress abolished the special work projects program
of WIN and replaced it with a new program entitled Public Service
Employment (PSE).1 37 The only significant difference between the
two programs is in the funding arrangements between the employ-
ers, the states, and the federal government.13 8 Instead of requiring
states to reimburse the Secretary of Labor for federal funds ad-
vanced to employers, as under the special work projects program,1 3 9
PSE requires the federal government to pay directly to the employer
one hundred percent of program costs (including wages) during the
first year, seventy-five percent during the second year, and fifty
percent during the third year.1 40
In the process of substituting PSE for the special work projects
program, the twenty percent disregard applicable to income derived
from special work projects was dropped from the Social Security Act
and no new incentive provision was added. 141 A closely related
provision, section 602(a) (19) (D), however, remains intact. 142 Section
602(a)(19)(D) states that income earned from participation in a
"special work project" shall be disregarded for AFDC purposes.1 43
Under the prior law, this section had been read in conjunction with
the twenty percent disregard provision, thereby preventing welfare
135 Id. § 633(e)(1).
,36 Participants in special work projects were entitled to supplementary welfare grants to
provide them with a total income equal in amount to the AFDC grant they would have
received had they not been participating in WIN, plus 20% of their earnings. Id. § 602-
(a)(19)(E). Although the total income of an individual employed on a special work project was
less than the total income of an individual earning the same monthly wages but employed in
the private sector of the economy, participants in special work projects were still better off
than nonworking families. The 20% disregard, like the $30 and one-third disregard, was
designed to provide a financial incentive for accepting employment.
137 42 U.S.C. §§ 632(b)(3), 633(e) (Supp. IV, 1974).
"' Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(19)(E), 633(e)(2) (1970) with 42 U.S.C. § 633(e)(2) (Supp.
IV, 1974).
"9 See Act ofJan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 204(b), 81 Stat. 891 (formerly codified in
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(E) (1970)), repealed by Act of Dec. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-223,
§ 3(a)(5), 85 Stat. 804.
140 See 42 U.S.C. § 633(e)(2)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974).
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19) (Supp. IV, 1974). The incentive provision was part of the
funding provision, which was totally overhauled by the 1971 amendments. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(19)(E) (1970).
,42 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(D) (Supp. IV, 1974).
'4 See id.; note 145 infra.
1976]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:777
recipients from receiving full AFDC payments in addition to special
work projects income.144 As the Act now reads, section 602(a)(19)(D)
arguably requires a one hundred percent disregard of PSE in-
come. 145
The proper interpretation of section 602(a)(19)(D) has been
widely litigated in recent months, and the district courts have
reached conflicting results. 146 At least one court has held that the
Social Security Act requires PSE wages to be totally disregarded in
determining benefit levels for AFDC purposes.147 The court found
the language of section 602(a)(19)(D) to be unambiguous, leaving no
room for interpretation. 48 Other courts have concluded that the
true intent of Congress in passing the 1971 amendments was to
eliminate disregards for PSE income altogether, and that section
602(a)(19)(D) was left unrepealed because of congressional over-
sight.149
144 See Betts v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 1122, 1125 (D. Vt. 1975); Linkenhoker v.
Weinberger, 387 F. Supp. 449, 454-55 (D. Md.), vacated as moot, 529 F.2d 51 (1975).
145 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(D)(i) (Supp. IV, 1974) provides:
[I]n come derived from a special work project under the program established by
section 632(b)(3) of this title shall be disregarded in determining the needs of an
individual under section 602(a)(7) of this title ....
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974) is also relevant: "[A]id under the [AFDC] plan will
not be denied ... by reason of an individual's participation on a project under the program
established by section 632(b)(2) or (3) of this title .... Although it could be argued that the
reference to a "special work project" rather than PSE renders § 602(a)(19)(D) inapplicable to
PSE income, the argument is inconclusive; §§ 602(a)(19)(B) and (D) also refer to "the program
established by section 632(b)(3)"-the section authorizing the PSE program.
146 See notes 147-49, 153 and accompanying text infra.
147 Dunbar v. Weinberger, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 20,039 (D. Mass. Aug. 7, 1974).
148 There is no room for interpretation of § 602(a)(19)(D). It either applies as clearly
stated or it does not apply at all. It is not within the province of this Court to say that
the section is of no effect. Whether or not the result it creates was anticipated or
intended by Congress is a matter of speculation.... If the effect of§ 602(a)(19)(D) is an
undesirable one, it is within the province of Congress, not the Court, to remedy it.
Dunbar v. Weinberger, Civil No. 74-862-F (D. Mass., Aug. 7, 1974) (unpublished).
The court in Dunbar noted that the original bill replacing the special work projects
program with the PSE program amended § 602(a)(19)(D) to delete any reference to a
disregard of earnings. S. 1019, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG, REc. 4380 (1971). The
amendment to § 602(a)(19)(D), however, was specifically rejected by the House Conference
Committee. H.R. REP. No. 747, 92d Cong., 1stSess. 2 (1971). Although the report provides no
explanation of the alteration, Congressman Mills, in support of the report, made the follow-
ing comment: "And I also want to make clear that there is nothing in this bill which would
affect the earnings disregard provision in present law." 117 CONG. REc. 46,774 (1971). The
court, applying the rule of construction that legislation should be interpreted to give it some
meaning, concluded that PSE workers were entitled to a 100% disregard of PSE payments.
Dunbar v. Weinberger, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 20,039 (D. Mass. 1974).
149 Betts v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Vt. 1975); Linkenhoker v. Weinberger,
387 F. Supp. 449 (D. Md. 1975); Ray v. Weinberger, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 151 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 12, 1975). All three courts employed essentially the same reasoning in holding that PSE
participants were not entitled to any disregard of their earned income.
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Both positions find some support in the legislative history of the
1971 Social Security Amendments.'"0 Neither position, however, fits
comfortably into the AFDC statutory scheme.1 5' The Supreme
Court's recent summary affirmance of Betts v. Mathezs,152 holding
that PSE wages should not be disregarded when calculating AFDC
payments, settles the issue.15 3
IV
ELIGIBILITY CONDITIONS UNRELATED TO NEED
A. Child Support Amendments
In 1973, households whose eligibility for AFDC was based on
the continued absence of a parent from the home constituted 80.2
percent of the total number of AFDC recipients. 54 This category of
Congress, in passing the 1971 amendments, expressed deep concern for the rapidly
increasing costs of AFDC. Since a 100% disregard of PSE income would increase rather than
decrease the cost of AFDC, the courts concluded that Congress could not have intended to
reach that result. See, e.g., Linkenhoker v. Weinberger, 387 F. Supp. 449, 453 (D. Md. 1975).
Congress also expressed a preference for private employment over public employment. See
Ray v. Weinberger, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 151 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 1975). Since the 100%
disregard greatly exceeds the work incentive applied to income derived from employment in
the private sector of the economy (see notes 130-31 and accompanying text supra), employable
AFDC recipients would be encouraged to seek public service employment rather than private
employment, in order to qualify for the 100% disregard. This result, the courts argued, would
directly conflict with the express policy of encouraging PSE participants to move into the
regular economy. See Ray v. Weinberger, 9 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 151 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 1975).
In further support of their decisions not to apply § 602(a)(19)(D) to PSE income, the
courts pointed to the close relationship prior to the 1971 amendments of §§ 602(a)(19)(D) and
602(a)(19)(E), which contained the 20% disregard provision. See notes 142-44 and accompany-
ing text supra. Under the prior law, § 602(a)(19)(E) prevented participants in special work
projects from receiving a double recovery tinder § 602(a)(19)(D). The only reasonable conclu-
sion, the courts stated, was that § 602(a)(19)(D) was simply overlooked by Congress and should
have been repealed along with § 602(a)(19)(E). Moreover, § 602(a)(19)(D) refers to special
work projects rather than PSE, and therefore does not apply to PSE income. See Linkenhoker
v. Weinberger, 387 F. Supp. 449, 453-54 (D. Md. 1975); note 145 supra.
150 The relevant legislative history is discussed in notes 148-49 supra.
151 The position of the majority of the courts requires §§ 602(a)(19)(B), (D) to be read out
of the statute. On the other hand, allowing PSE workers to receive full AFDC checks as well as
their earned income is inconsistent with the federal policies of reducing AFDC expenditures
and favoring employment in the regular economy. See note 149 supra.
152 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 21,739 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1975).
153 Id.
154 S. REP. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1974). The other categories of AFDC
recipients consist of children deprived of parental support because of a parent's death, mental
or physical incapacity, and, in some states, unemployment. See HANnBOOK, sllpra note 16, at
143.
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recipients has grown steadily in recent years.1 55 In an effort to
reduce the mushrooming cost of AFDC by deterring parents from
abandoning their families,1 56 Congress enacted a major amendment
to the Social Security Act, which went into effect on July 1, 1975.157
This child support bill establishes a comprehensive program for
determining the paternity of illegitimate children receiving AFDC
and for enforcing support obligations owed by absent parents to
AFDC children.15 8 The program is designed to ensure that parents
who are able to support their children, but have failed to do so,
shoulder the burden that otherwise falls on the welfare system. 15:
Although the Social Security Act had previously required states
participating in the AFDC program to establish agencies for secur-
ing child support,160 the old provisions were not effectively im-
plemented in most states. 61 Moreover, attempts by the states to
condition AFDC eligibility on the mother's cooperation in support
proceedings were struck down by the courts162 as inconsistent with
the Social Security Act.16 3
155 In 1961, only 66.7% of AFDC recipients based their eligibility on the absence of a
parent from the home. S. REP. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1974).
156 Id.
"' Act ofJan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 101,88 Stat. 2351,asanmended, Actof Aug. 9,
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-88, tit. 2, 89 Stat. 433 (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
158 See notes 164-71 and accompanying text infra.
'.': See 120 COxG. REc. H 12,587 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1974) (remarks of Representative
Pettis).
160 As early as 1952, state welfare agencies were required to give prompt notice to law
enforcement officials of AFDC children deserted by one of their parents. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(I 1) (1970). The Social Security Amendments of 1967 established child support and
paternity units within the welfare agencies, and required the agencies to utilize reciprocal
arrangements with other states to secure support payments. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(17)-(18)
(1970).
161 S. REP. No. 1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1974). HEW supervision of state child
support programs was at best perfunctory. Id. The law contained no mechanisms specifically
designed to encourage effective child support programs. The new child support law attempts
to correct these deficiencies by establishing a separate unit within HEW to supervise state child
support programs and by imposing financial penalties on noncomplying states. See note 164
and accompanying text iitra.
162 See, e.g., Shirley v. Lavine, 365 F. Supp. 818 (N.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'dper curiam sub nor.
Lascaris v. Shirley, 420 U.S. 730 (1975); Meyers v. Juras, 327 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ore.), aff'd
mner., 404 U.S. 803 (1971); Taylor v. Martin, 330 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd mewe. Sub now.
Carleson v. Taylor, 404 U.S. 980 (1971); Doe v. Swank, 332 F. Supp. 61 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd mew.
sub nom. Weaver v. Doe, 404 U.S. 987 (1971).
163 Section 402(a)(10) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (1970)) provides
that "aid to families with dependent children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to
all eligible individuals." This section has been interpreted by the Supreme Court as prohibit-
ing states participating in the AFDC program from imposing eligibility criteria unrelated to
need in addition to the federal eligibility standards, in the absence of authorization from
Congress. Although the states retain considerable discretion in establishing standards of need
and levels of benefits (see King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1968); note 303 and accom-
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The new law establishes a federal child support unit within
HEW to supervise states' efforts to collect child support payments
and impose financial penalties on noncomplying states.' 64 The unit
must also establish a federal information bank, the "Parent Locator
Service,"'1 65 designed to obtain and transmit information as to the
whereabouts of absent parents, including the most recent address
and place of employment. Collection of support payments is facili-
tated by enabling states to enforce support orders in federal
panying text supra), the remaining eligibility conditions must, as a general rule, be consistent
with and no broader than federal standards. But see New York State Dep't of Social Services v.
Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973) (holding that states are free to establish work programs to
supplement WIN); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (permitting states to terminate
AFDC assistance if the parent refuses to submit to a home visit required under state law).
The federalization of eligibility conditions unrelated to need began with King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309 (1968), in which the Supreme Court struck down a state regulation that denied
AFDC to children of a mother who cohabited with a man who was not the father of her
children. Finding that such households were eligible for AFDC under federal standards
(assuming other eligibility criteria were met), the Court held that the state regulation, al-
though it furthered the state's interest in discouraging immorality and illegitimacy, was fatally
inconsistent with federal law and policy and therefore invalid under the supremacy clause.
The principle established in King was reaffirmed by the Court in Townsend v. Swank, 404
U.S. 282 (1971) (holding that states could not exclude college students under age 21 from
AFDC coverage), and again in Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972) (holding that states
could not define "continued absence" from the home to exclude parents in military service).
As it was summarized in Townsend:
[A]t least in the absence of congressional authorization for the exclusion clearly
evidenced from the Social Security Act or its legislative history, a state eligibility
standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under federal AFDC standards
violates the Social Security Act and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.
404 U.S. at 286. The cases cited in note 162 supra relied on the principle established in the
King-Townsend-Remnillard trilogy.
164 The child support unit's duties include setting minimum standards for state child
support programs, reviewing and evaluating state plans, conducting annual audits of state
child support programs, and providing technical assistance to the states. 42 U.S.C. § 652(a)
(Supp. IV, 1974). If as a result of its audit the unit finds that a state is not complying with its
approved plan or tie minimum federal standards, 5%f of the federal funds to which the state
would otherwise by entitled are withheld for the year. Id. § 603(h).
"5 42 U.S.C. § 653 (Supp. IV, 1974). Any "authorized person," as defined by the Act,
may request information from the service for use in locating an absent parent and enforcing
support obligations. Among the individuals given access to the service are parents or guar-
dians of children, other than AFDC recipients, who are not but should be receiving child
support payments. Id. § 653(c)
The original child support bill dramatically expanded access to welfare records. Previ-
ously, the contents of AFDC records could be disclosed only for purposes directly connected
with the administration of AFDC. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(9) (1970). The child support bill
allowed information concerning AFDC recipients to also be disclosed to "public officials" who
needed the information "in connection with their official duties." 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(9) (Supp.
IV, 1974). Act of Aug. 9, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-88, tit. 2, § 207, 89 Stat. 436, repealed this
broad provision and replaced it with a much narrower and more specific one authorizing
disdosure of welfare records in any investigation, prosecution, or civil or criminal proceeding
directly connected with the administration of federally subsidized assistance programs. 42
U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(9) (Supp. 1976).
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courts,166 use the collection mechanisms of the Internal Revenue
Service, 167 and garnish the wages of federal employees.
168
Included among the child support provisions are three new
eligibility conditions that AFDC applicants or recipients must now
satisfy. First, each applicant or recipient must assign to the state all
rights to support on behalf of himself and any other family
member. n1 6 9 Second, the recipient or applicant must cooperate with
the state in establishing the paternity of illegitimate children and in
obtaining support payments, unless the parent has good cause for
not cooperating.17 0 Finally, applicants or recipients are required to
furnish the Social Security account number of every member of the
household. 71
The statute expressly provides that failure of an AFDC parent
to comply with either the assignment or the cooperation condition
renders only the parent and not the children ineligible for assis-
tance.1 72 If other eligibility criteria are met, the children of a non-
complying parent continue to receive AFDC in the form of protec-
tive payments.' 73 Unlike the requirements of assignment and coop-
eration, however, the statute does not authorize protective payments
to the children of applicants who fail to furnish the required Social
Security numbers; 74 a parent's failure to comply with this condition
apparently renders the entire household ineligible for assistance.
175
166 42 U.S.C. § 660 (Supp. IV, 1974).
167 Id. § 652(b).
16 Id. § 659. Under the child support law, the federal government reimburses states for
75% of their child support program costs as compared to the old reimbursement rate of 50%.
Id. § 655. Localities collecting assigned support payments for the state, and states collecting
support payments for other states, are given bonus payments. Id. § 658(a).
I'll Id. § 692(a)(26)(A).
170 Id. § 602(a)(26)(B); 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(26)(B) (Supp. 1976). By making cooperation
a federally mandated condition of eligibility for aid, Congress rendered the conflict over the
validity of state-imposed disclosure and cooperation requirements moot. See note 162 and
accompanying text supra: Note, 1974 Developnents in Welfare Law, supra note 11, at 871-75.
Although the original bill made no provision for waiving the requirement when parental
cooperation would not serve the best interests of the child, this flaw has been corrected by Act
of Aug. 9, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-88, tit. 2, § 208, 89 Stat. 436. Noncooperation is now permitted
for "good cause." 42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(26)(B) (Supp. 1976).
171 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25) (Supp. IV, 1974).
172 Id. § 602(a)(26).
173 Id. As protective payments, children's benefits are paid either to a concerned individ-
ual other than the parent for use of the children or directly to the persons furnishing food,
housing, and other goods and services to the children. See 42 U.S.C. § 606(b)(2) (1970).
274 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25) (Supp. IV, 1974).
115 Although neither the statute nor the regulations are explicit on this point, the absence
of an express provision limiting the consequences of failure to furnish Social Security numbers
to ineligibility of the parent and not the children may be viewed by the states as an authoriza-
tion to deny assistance to the entire household.
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A probable area of litigation involves the fluid concept of
"cooperating" with the state. Although the HEW regulations offer
the states some guidance in administering the requirement, 76 no
limitations are placed on the states' power to deny aid to applicants
whose conduct fails to conform to state definitions of coopera-
tion.1 77 A more precise definition of cooperation and permissible
exceptions to the requirement will therefore have to be furnished by
the courts.178
In an effort to circumvent earlier court decisions invalidating
state-imposed conditions of cooperation,1 7 9 at least one state im-
posed civil and criminal sanctions on uncooperative AFDC
mothers. 180 Since parents are now required under federal law to
cooperate with the state in locating absent parents and in obtaining
support payments, 8 state laws forcing parental cooperation
through punitive sanctions have arguably been preempted.
The Supreme Court's short per curiam opinion in Roe v. Nor-
ton 1 82 may have some bearing on the question of preemption. In
Norton, AFDC mothers of illegitimate children challenged a Connec-
ticut statute requiring unmarried mothers to identify the fathers of
their children under threat of imprisonment or a fine for con-
tempt.8 3 A three-judge district court held that the statute did not
176 45 C.F.R. § 232.12(b) (1975) provides:
"Cooperate" includes the following:
(1) Appearing at the offices of the State or local agency or the child support agency as
necessary to provide verbal or written information, or documentary evidence, known
to, possessed by, or reasonably obtainable by him, that is relevant to achieving the
objectives of [identifying and locating absent parents, establishing the paternity of
illegitimate children, and obtaining support payments];
(2) Appearing as a witness at court or other hearings or proceedings necessary to
achieving the [above] objectives . . .
(3) Providing information, or attesting to the lack of information, under penalty of
perjury; and
(4) After an assignment under § 233.11 has been made, paying to the child support
agency any child support payments received from the absent parent which are
covered by such assignment.
,77 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974); 45 C.F.R. § 232.12(b) (1975).
178 Another issue raised by the cooperation requirement is the constitutionality of com-
pelling disclosure by unmarried mothers of the names of the fathers of their children. For a
summary of the questions involved, see Note, 1974 Developments in Welfare Law, supra note 11,
at 875-76. Although the Supreme Court had the opportunity to decide at least some of these
constitutional questions in Roe v. Norton, 422 U.S. 391 (1975), the case was decided on
statutory rather than constitutional grounds. See notes 182-86 and accompanying text ihfra.
See note 162 and accompanying text supra.
0 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-440 (1975), which provides for a fine, imprisonment,
or both for failure to disclose information about the biological father of illegitimate children
or for failure to prosecute a paternity action.
2' See note 170 and accompanying text supra.
312 422 U.S. 391 (1975).
,13 Id. at 392.
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conflict with the Social Security Act, 184 but the Supreme Court
vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further considera-
tion in light of the new federal law, which the Court pointed out does
not impose comparable punitive sanctions on noncooperating par-
ents. In the event that a criminal proceeding was pending under
the Connecticut statute, the district court was also directed to recon-
sider the case in light of two Supreme Court cases outlining the
circumstances under which state court proceedings may be en-
joined by federal courts. 85
Roe v. Norton may be interpreted as suggesting that additional
penalties imposed for failure to cooperate with the state are pre-
empted by, and therefore impermissible under, the Social Security
Act.186 Because of the brevity of the opinion, however, its implica-
tions are not yet clear.
B. Presumptions of Fraudulent Intent
Most states deny AFDC eligibility to applicants who have trans-
ferred property without receiving fair consideration in order to
qualify for assistance.' 87 Some states also deny eligibility to appli-
cants who have voluntarily terminated their employment or reduced
their earning capacity for the purpose of meeting AFDC income
tests.' 88 These restrictions are intended to prevent the disbursement
of public funds to voluntarily impoverished individuals who would
otherwise be independent of the welfare system. All doubts are
usually resolved against the applicant by establishing a presumption
that a transfer of property or termination of employment within a
given period of time before applying was undertaken with the intent
to qualify for assistance.' 89 Such presumptions, whether rebuttable
84 Doe v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973). The court also upheld the statute
against claims that it violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the United States
Constitution, and that it impermissibly invaded the constitutional right of privacy. For an
analysis of the issues presented and their resolution by the district court, see Note, 1974
Developments in Welfare Law, supra note 11, at 875-77.
185 422 U.S. at 393. The two cases cited by the Court were Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), and Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). Younger set forth the rules
applicable to enjoining state criminal prosecutions, and Huffmnan extended the Younger rules to
civil nuisance proceedings.
186 An alernative interpretation is that the Court simply refused to rule on the issue
because of the new federal law, which was enacted after the three-judge district court decision.
This interpretation, however, does not explain why the Court wrote the per curiam opinion or
why the Younger and Huff man cases were cited as material.
187 See HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 148.
188 See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131(11) (McKinney 1976), discussed in notes
203-07 and accompanying text infra.
'89 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.185(1)(b) (1973); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131(11)
(McKinney 1976).
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or irrebuttable, have recently come under attack as inconsistent with
the Social Security Act and violative of due process.' 90
In the leading case of Owens v. Roberts, '9' a Florida statute and
regulation restricting property transfers were invalidated on con-
stitutional and statutory grounds. The statute established a rebutta-
ble presumption that all transfers of property made within two years
prior to the date of application for assistance were undertaken with
the intent to qualify for welfare.' 92 The corresponding regulation
converted the rebuttable presumption into an irrebuttable presump-
tion by providing that a transfer of property worth over $600 for
less than its fair market value disqualified an applicant for two years
from the date of transfer. 193 Although the two named plaintiffs
strikingly illustrated the inequities generated by the presumption of
fraudulent intent, 194 both were denied benefits solely because they
had transferred property in the recent past for less than its assessed
value.
1 9 5
A three-judge federal district court struck down the transfer
provisions on essentially two grounds. First, both the regulation and
the statute were found to violate due process.' 96 The court held the
irrebuttable presumption established by the regulation to be arbi-
trary, irrational, and often contrary to fact.' 97 The statute itself,
which created a rebuttable presumption, was invalidated for lack of
190 See notes 191-215 and accompanying text infra.
191 377 F. Supp. 45 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
192 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.185(1)(b) (1973).
193 FLA. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, FAMILY SERVICES DIVISION ch.
V, § II, quoted in Owens v. Roberts, 377 F. Supp. 45, 48 n.3 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
194 One sold her home for half of its assessed value in order to pay her husband's funeral
expenses. The other, whose health was failing, sold her business equipment (furniture) on
doctor's orders; since there was no market for used furniture, she was only able to secure
one-third of its assessed value. 377 F. Supp. at 50-51.
'"' Id. The plaintiffs were applicants for Old Age Assistance and Aid to the Totally and
Permanently Disabled (both federally subsidized programs). The court's analysis of the issues,
however, applies to AFDC as well.
196 Id. at 51-54.
197 Id. at 52. See also Garcia v. Silverman, 393 F. Supp. 590 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (invalidating
irrebuttable presumption that public assistance applicants who had voluntarily terminated
their employment more than once within prior year were unwilling to comply with state's work
rule and therefore ineligible for assistance).
The well-selected plaintiffs in Ow'ens made the court's conclusion more compelling:
The only factor which distinguishes these named plaintiffs from other individuals
who are eligible for assistance is that these plaintiffs, under economic duress, made
innocuous transfers of property for less than fair market value. Yet the plaintiffs,
being elderly, disabled, unemployed and unemployable, and plainly impoverished,
were nevertheless denied assistance. The arbitrariness and irrationality of this con-
dusive and automatic attribution of fraudulent intent without considering such
factors as economic coercion, ignorance or the good faith of the claimant plainly flies
in the face of the altruistic purpose underpinning welfare legislation.
377 F. Supp. at 51-52.
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a rational connection between the fact proved (prior transfer of
property) and the fact presumed (fraudulent intent). 98 The court
found it more likely that applicants liquidate assets "in order to
subsist temporarily" than to qualify for public assistance. 199 Second,
the court struck down the transfer provisions as being inconsistent
with the Social Security Act.200 Noting that federal law places no
such penalties upon the failure to explain why an asset was trans-
ferred, the court concluded on the basis of the King-Townsend-
Remillard trilogy201 that the provisions must fall.20 2
The validity of the court's due process analysis in Owens has
been seriously undermined by the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Lavine v. Milne,20 3 upholding the constitutionality of a New York
statutory provision creating a presumption of fraudulent intent
similar to the presumption at issue in Owens. The New York statute
involved in Milne denies eligibility for a period of seventy-five days
to all AFDC or general assistance applicants who voluntarily termi-
nate their employment or reduce their earning capacity for the
purpose of qualifying for assistance. 20 4 The statute also provides
198 377 F. Supp. at 53-54. See also Gardner v. Lavine, 2 CGH Pov. L. REP. 20,646 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y., Feb. 24, 1975), which followed Owens in holding that New York's restrictions on
property transfers, to the extent that they created a presumption of fraud, violated the due
process clause.
199 377 F. Supp. at 53.
Besides economic pressures, many other considerations, including sound business
practice, which have no connection at all with intent to defraud the welfare au-
thorities, may dictate that transfer of an asset is appropriate. The "generality of
experience" manifestly contradicts the conclusion that fraud may be inferred from
the mere transfer of property.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
200 Id. at 55.
201 These major cases are King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Townsend v. Swank, 404
U.S. 282 (1971); and Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972). For a discussion of the
doctrine developed in these cases see note 163 supra.
202 377 F. Supp. at 55. See also Robertson v. Lavine, 71 Misc. 2d 757, 337 N.Y.S.2d 237
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1972) (conditioning AFDC eligibility upon securing fair consideration for
transfers of property violates Social Security Act).
The Owens court emphasized the inconsistency between the Florida provisions and the
federal regulation providing that "[m]ethods of determining eligibility must be consistent with
the objective of assisting all eligible persons to qualify.... 45 C.F.R. § 233.10(a)(1)(vii) (1975),
quoted in 377 F. Supp. at 54-55. The court also pointed out that the federal regulations
governing welfare fraud (45 C.F.R. § 235.110 (1975)) placed the duty of investigating such
fraud on the state welfare authorities, rather than requiring individual applicants to explain
why a transfer of property or other transaction was not fraudulent. 377 F. Supp. at 55. The
court, however, made no attempt to reconcile its holding with the two Supreme Court cases
that depart from the King-Townsend-Remillard rationale: New York Dep't of Social Servs. v.
Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). See note 163 supra.
203 96 S. Ct. 1010 (1976).
204 Any person who voluntarily terminated his employment or voluntarily reduced
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that any person who applies for public assistance within seventy-five
days after voluntarily terminating his employmentor reducing his
earning capacity will be "deemed" to have done so "for the pur-
pose of qualifying for such assistance or a larger amount thereof, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary supplied by such person. '20 5
This latter provision was struck down by a three-judge district
court20 6 on the same due process ground used by the Owens court to
invalidate the rebuttable presumption: an insufficient connection
between the fact proved (voluntary termination of employment or
reduction in earning capacity) and the fact presumed (intent -to
qualify for welfare).20 7
The Supreme Court, however, unanimously rejected the lower
court's due process analysis in a brief but far-reaching opinion.2 0 8
Stressing that applicants for public assistance must bear the burden
of proving their eligibility, the Court construed the language at issue
as creating a mere "circumlocutory direction to welfare authorities"
to make the "normal assumption that an applicant is not entitled to
benefits unless and until he proves his eligibility. '20 9 Since the appli-
cant already had the burden of proof, the provision does not, accord-
ing to the Court, create a rebuttable presumption:
Although the District Court found this to be an unconstitutional
his earning capacity for the purpose of qualifying for home relief or aid to dependent
children or a larger amount thereof shall be disqualified from receiving such assis-
tance for seventy-five days from such termination or reduction, unless otherwise
required by federal law or regulation.
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131(11) (McKinney 1976).
205 Any person who applies for home relief or aid to dependent children or requests
an increase in his grant within seventy-five days after voluntarily terminating his
employment or reducing his earning capacity shall, unless otherwise required b'
federal law or regulation, be deemed to have voluntarily terminated his employment
or reduced his earning capacity for the purpose of qualifying for such assistance or a
larger amount thereof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary supplied by such
person.
Id.
206 Milne v. terman, 384 F. Supp. 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
207 Id. at 211. The court noted that
Any number of reasons for terminating employment exist-desire for advance-
ment, problems of health, family problems, transportation problems, personality
conflicts, working conditions, and perhaps simply basic discontent with a job, to
mention a few . . . . There may also be numerous reasons why a person who
terminates his employment subsequently becomes impoverished and has to resort to
a request for public assistance-general economic conditions, a decline in jobs avail-
able in a particular industry, health, or failure to receive an anticipated new position.
I& at 210-11 (footnotes omitted). The court, finding that the presumption compelling an
inference of fraudulent intent was arbitrary and unreasonable, concluded that the statute was
unconstitutional. Id. at 211.
208 Lavine v. Milne, 96 S. Ct. 1010 (1976). Justice Stevens took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of the case.
209 Id. at 1015.
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"rebuttable presumption," the sole purpose of the provision is to
indicate that, as with other eligibility requirements, the applicant
rather than the State must establish that he did not leave employ-
ment for the purpose of qualifying for benefits. The provision
carries with it no procedural consequence; it shifts to the applicant
neither the burden of going forward nor the burden of proof, for
he appears to carry the burden from the outset.
Despite the rebuttable presumption aura that the second sen-
tence of § 131(11) radiates, it merely makes absolutely clear the
fact that the applicant bears the burden of proof on this issue, as
he does on all others. 210
By refusing to characterize the provision as creating a rebutta-
ble presumption, the Court was able to dismiss as irrelevant such
cases as Western & Atlantic R.R. v. Henderson,211 which invalidated
rebuttable presumptions for lack of a rational connection between
the fact proved and the fact presumed.212 The Court held that the
remaining question, whether the burden of proving the absence of
fraudulent intent had been unfairly placed on applicants for public
assistance, does not raise an issue of federal constitutional law:
[I]t is not for us to resolve the question of where the burden ought
to lie on this issue. Outside the criminal law area, where special
concerns attend, the locus of the burden of persuasion is normally
not an issue of federal constitutional moment.2 13
210 Id. The Court's interpretation of the statutory provision was not convincing. Not only did
it render the provision superfluous, but it disregarded altogether the federal regulation
governing welfare fraud, which places the duty of investigating possible fraud on the state
welfare authorities rather than requiring the individual applicant to prove the absence of a
fraudulent motive. See 45 C.F.R. § 235.110(b) (1975).
211 279 U.S. 639 (1929).
212 96 S. Ct. 1010, 1015 n.9 (1976). The distinguishing feature, according to the Court,
was that the rebuttable persumption cases involved shifting the burden of proof from one
party to the other, whereas the statutory provision in question placed the burden of proof on
the applicant from the outset.
213 Id. at 1016. Both the Owens court and the lower court in Miler were heavily influenced
by policy considerations militating against imposing the burden of proof on welfare applicants
or recipients. Owens v. Roberts, 377 F. Supp. 45, 53 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Milne v. Berman, 384 F.
Supp. 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The courts stressed that the opportunity to rebut a presump-
tion of fraudulent intent meant little to the poor, who were "the least capable socially,
intellectually, economically and physically to employ the means to rebut the presumption."
377 F. Supp. at 53. In Milne, the court rejected the state's argument that it was reasonable to
place the burden of proving the absence of fraudulent intent on the public assistance applicant
because his motive was within his knowledge alone, and instead followed Owens by arguing
that the poverty of the individuals to whom the presumption applied deserved special atten-
tion. The court stated:
What we are concerned with here is a matter of fairness and experience, resolving
itself ultimately into a question of policy. In the situation before this court, those
persons to whom the presumption is directed are typically the least capable to employ
the means to rebut the presumption .... To require these persons to prove their
806
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The Court's disposition of the rebuttable presumption question
in Milne forecloses a major avenue of attack on state attempts to
render various types of AFDC applicants presumptively ineligible
for assistance.2 1 4 The only remaining argument, upheld by the court
in Owens, is that such presumptions of fraudulent intent are incon-
sistent with the Social Security Act under the King-Townsend-
Remillard rationale.215
C. Unemployed Fathers
The AFDC-UF (unemployed fathers) program was instituted in
1961216 to provide financial assistance to families with children who
are needy because of their fathers' unemployment.2 17 Although the
states are not required to participate in AFDC-UF, twenty-four
states have adopted the program. 218
The most significant activity in AFDC-UF in recent months has
centered around the definition of "unemployment ' 219 and the rela-
innocent motives for terminating employment is effectively to deny them all chances
of obtaining the benefits which they seek.
Milne v. Berman, 384 F. Supp. 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
24 The Supreme Court in Milne also considered a second argument against the constitu-
tionality of the New York statute. Since obtaining a fair hearing decision on the issue of the
applicant's motive could take as long as 90 days, by which time the 75-day waiting period
would have elapsed, the respondents argued that the hearing procedure was meaningless.
They contended that the requirements of procedural due process articulated in Goldberg v.
Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), mandated that an opportunity for a hearing be provided prior to
imposing the 75-day "sanction." 96 S. Ct. at 1016. Without purporting to employ the
traditional balancing test prescribed in Goldberg for determining whether due process re-
quired a prior hearing, the Court simply stated that
nothing in the Constitution requires that benefits be initiated prior to the determina-
tion of an applicant's qualifications at an adjudicatory hearing.
Id The implications of this hasty dismissal of the procedural due process argument are not yet
clear.
215 Since the plaintiffs in Milne were applicants for Home Relief, New York's nonfeder-
ally funded general assistance program (see 96 S. Ct. at 1013), this argument was not
available to the respondents, and remains unaffected by the Supreme Court's decision.
21' Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, § 1, 75 Stat. 75 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 607
(1970)).
2,7 As originally enacted, AFDC-UF applied to unemployed mothers as well as unem-
ployed fathers. In order to eliminate the state practice of furnishing assistance to families in
which the father was working but the mother was unemployed, the 1967 Social Security
Amendments restricted the program to children of unemployed fathers. 42 U.S.C. § 607
(1970). A father is deemed unemployed if he works less than 100 hours a month. 45 C.F.R.
§ 233.100(a)(1) (1975). In order for his family to be eligible for AFDC-UF, a father must be
unemployed for 30 days and must not have refused without good cause a bona fide offer of
employment. He must also have had a substantial connection with the work force, and cannot
be receiving unemployment compensation. All AFDC-UF applicants are required to register
for the WIN program. 42 U.S.C. § 607(b) (1970).
218 HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 144, 156-57.
2 See notes 224-44 and accompanying text infra. 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1970) requires the
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tionship between AFDC-UF and unemployment compensation pro-
grams.2 2 0 Some states have attempted to exclude from the program
participants in labor strikes or fathers discharged for misconduct. 221
Others have limited its applicability to fathers ineligible for unem-
ployment compensation. Litigation in 1975 focused on whether
such exclusions are consistent with the Social Security Act.2 23
1. Definition of Unemployment
The current HEW regulation allows states, at their option, to
deny AFDC-UF to fathers who are either ineligible for state unem-
ployment compensation or whose unemployment results from par-
ticipation in a labor dispute. 224 This regulation was challenged in
two Maryland district court cases as being incompatible with the
Social Security Act. 225
The first case, Francis v. Davidson,2 6 [hereinafter cited as Francis
Secretary of HEW to prescribe standards for defining unemployment. Under the 1961
legislation, the definition of unemployment was left to the individual states. States adopted
widely varying definitions, rendering uniform administration of the program impossible. See
H.R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1967); Hearings on H.R. 12080 Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 268-69 (1967) (statement of Wilburj. Cohen, Under-
secretary of HEW). Congress responded in 1967 by enacting a number of additional eligibility
conditions (see note 217 supra), and by expressly directing the Secretary of HEW to promul-
gate a federal definition of unemployment. 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1970).
220 See notes 245-65 and accompanying text infra.
221 See, e.g., SOCIAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, MARYLAND DEP'T OF EMPLOYMENT AND
SOCIAL SERVICES, Rule 200.A.Z.(2), quoted in Francis v. Davidson, 340 F. Supp. 351, 356 n.14
(D. Md.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 904 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Francis I]; Carney, The Forgotten Man
on the Welfare Roll: A Study of Public Subsidies for Strikers, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 469, 479-94.
222 See, e.g., Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975) (striking down Vermont practice
of denying AFDC-UF benefits to any applicant or recipient who was eligible for but not
necessarily receiving unemployment compensation). The primary disqualifying factors are
voluntary separation from work, discharge for misconduct, refusal of suitable work, and
unemployment due to a labor dispute. See HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 54.
223 See notes 225-41, 245-65 and accompanying text infra.
224 In 1973, 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a)(1) was amended to provide:
[A]t the option of the State, such definition [of unemployment] need not include a
father whose unemployment results from participation in a labor dispute or who is
unemployed by reason of conduct or circumstances which result or would result in
disqualification for unemployment compensation under the State's unemployment
compensation law.
The option to exclude certain fathers from AFDC-UF was added to the regulation in
response to the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Francis I, 340 F. Supp. 351 (D. Md.),
aff'd, 409 U.S. 904 (1972). The HEW regulation, as it then stood, defined unemployment
exclusively in terms of the number of hours worked without reference to any reason or
reasons for unemployment.
221 See notes 226-41 and accompanying text infra.
12 379 F. Supp. 78 (D. Md. 1974). This is the same case that in Francis I prompted HEW
in 1973 to amend its regulation to permit states to deny eligibility for AFDC-UF to fathers who
were discharged for misconduct. See note 224 supra. Shortly after its 1972 Francis I decision,
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II], involved Maryland's practice of excluding fathers on strike and
fathers discharged from their jobs as a result of misconduct.227 A
three-judge panel held that the federal and state regulations au-
thorizing such exclusions were invalid under the Social Security
Act.228 In striking down the exclusions, the court relied on two
distinct grounds.2 2 9 Citing the unqualified language of the Social
Security Act providing for aid to "a needy child ... who has been
deprived of parental support or care by reason of the unemployment
(as determined in accordance with standards prescribed by the Sec-
retary) of his father . ., "230 the court concluded that HEW may not
authorize the denial of AFDC-UF to families of fathers discharged
for misconduct:
The statute relates to the unemployment of a father-and a father
who is discharged for cause by his employer is unemployed....
Until the Congress amends the statute, no combination of federal
and state regulations may provide that a father who is unem-
ployed is not unemployed. 231
In contrast to an individual who has been fired from his job, the
court held that a person out of work because of a labor dispute need
not necessarily be considered unemployed.2 32 HEW's downfall in its
treatment of strikers, however, was its failure to establish standards
to guide the states in defining unemployment,2 33 as required under
the Social Security Act.2 34 The regulation giving states the option to
exclude strikers235 "established no standards for the States to follow
and simply permitted each State to do as it chose. '236 The court
the district court enjoined the Maryland regulation. See 379 F. Supp. at 80 n.4. The state
welfare officials, citing the change in the federal regulations eliminating the conflict between
the two, moved in 1974 (Francis II) to dissolve the injunction. Id. at 80.
227 See MD. ANN. CODE art. 95A, § 6 (1969); SOCIAL SERVICES ADMINIsTRATION, MARY-
LAND DEP'T OF EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL SERvs., Rule 200.X.A.(2), quoted in Francis I, 340 F.
Supp. 351, 356 n.14 (D. Md. 1972).
221 379 F. Supp. at 81-82.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 81, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1970) (emphasis in original).
231 379 F. Supp. at 81 (emphasis in original).
232 Id. at 81-82. There is no evidence that Congress even considered the applicability of
AFDC-UF to strikers when it enacted the program in 1961. See Carney, supra note 221, at 476;
Comment, Strikers' Eligibility For Public Assistance: The Standard Based on Need, 52 J. URBAN L.
115, 123 (1974); Francis I, 340 F. Supp. 351,367, 375-77 (D. Md. 1972). It has been suggested
that requiring states to include strikers in their AFDC-UF programs might deter states from
participating in the program. See Note, Developments in Welfare Lau'-1973, 59 CORNELL L.
REv. 859, 878 (1974).
233 379 F. Supp. at 81-82.
234 See 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1970); note 219 supra.
232 See 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a)(1) (1975).
236 379 F. Supp. at 81.
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suggested that compliance with the Act could be achieved by amend-
ing the federal regulation to (1) exclude strikers, (2) include strikers,
or (3) allow states to make their own decisions within the confines of
specific federal guidelines. 237
In the second case, Bethea v. Mason,2 3s the question was whether
or not Maryland could exercise its option to exclude from AFDC-UF
fathers who had voluntarily terminated their employment.239 Rely-
ing on Francis II, the court reiterated its conclusion that the federal
and state regulations, allowing fathers who were in fact unemployed
to be treated as not unemployed, were inconsistent with the Social
Security Act.2 40 Both Francis I and Bethea were recently affirmed by
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. 241
In an attempt to conform its regulations to the district court's
decision in Francis II, HEW has proposed a new regulation 242 that
withdraws from the states the option of excluding fathers who are
unemployed because of conduct or circumstances that would result
in disqualification for state unemployment compensation. 243 If the
regulation goes into effect without substantial alteration, states will
no longer be able to deny eligibility for AFDC-UF to households in
which the father either has been fired or has voluntarily quit his job.
The proposed regulation requires states to exclude fathers on strike
237 Id. at 82. The three alternatives were first suggested by the court in its 1972 Francis I
opinion. 340 F. Supp. at 367. The third alternative, however, was simply to leave the decision
to the states. In its 1974 opinion, the court admitted that the third option, literally read,
permitted the amendment to 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a)(1) (1975) promulgated by HEW on July
12, 1973. The court therefore modified the language of the third alternative:
That language could have, and from hindsight should have, included as part of
alternative (3) and after the words "to leave that decision to the state" the additional
words "in accordance with appropriate standards established by the Secretary."
379 F. Supp. at 82. The court distinguished defining unemployment from establishing
standards to guide the states in promulgating their own definitions of unemployment. Id. Only
the latter is required by the Social Security Act. See notes 242-44 and accompanying text infra.
238 384 F. Supp. 1274 (D. Md. 1974).
239 Betuea involved a different application of the same state regulation at issue in both of
the Francis cases. See note 227 and accompanying text supra.
240 384 F. Supp. at 1280-81.
241 Francis v. Chamber of Commerce, Nos. 74-1991, 74-1992, 75-1165 (4th Cir. Sept. 22,
1975). The court adopted the district court opinions in Bethea and Francis I as its own. Id.
Maryland had filed notices of appeal of the Francis II decision in both the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals, thereby protecting its right to appeal if the Supreme Court dismissed
the appeal there for lack ofjurisdiction, as it subsequently did. The Supreme Court, treating
the papers as a petition of certiorari before judgment, also denied certiorari. 419 U.S. 1042
(1974); 420 U.S. 903 (1975).
242 40 Fed. Reg. 33,461 (1975) (proposing an amendment to 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a)(1)
(1975)).
243 Id.
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if the father's involvement in the labor dispute would render him
ineligible for unemployment compensation under state law. 44
2. Unemployment Compensation
In 1975, the Supreme Court resolved the important issue of
whether families of unemployed fathers may be denied benefits
under the AFDC-UF program because the father is eligible for
unemployment compensation under state or federal law.245 The
Court's decision that unemployed fathers are entitled, at their op-
tion, to receive either AFDC-UF or unemployment compensation
has far-reaching implications for the future of unemployment com-
pensation,246 and represents an additional limitation on the permis-
sible scope of state discretion in administering AFDC. 247
Section 407(b)(2)(C)(ii) of the Social Security Act requires states
to deny benefits under the AFDC-UF program "with respect to any
week for which such child's father receives unemployment compen-
sation under an unemployment compensation law of a State or of
the United States. ' 248 Vermont instituted a practice of denying
AFDC-UF benefits to any applicant who was eligible but not neces-
sarily receiving unemployment compensation. 249 Several fathers re-
244 Id. The introductory comments to the proposal indicate that HEW adopted the third
approach to participants in strikes. See note 237 and accompanying text supra.
The comments explain that
by tying the eligibility for AFDC-UF of a father not working as the result of participa-
tion in a labor dispute to that father's eligibility for State unemployment compensa-
tion benefits, we will define the standards which the district court stated were
required by statute.
40 Fed. Reg. 33,461 (1975).
245 Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975).
246 It has been argued that allowing unemployed fathers to choose whether to receive
unemployment compensation or AFDC-UF will "shift drastically the burden of supporting
families of unemployed fathers from the unemployment compensation program to the AFCD
program." Brief for Appellant at 27, Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 714 n.9 (1975). As a
result, the public sector rather than the private sector will be forced to bear the expense, and
private employers, whose obligation under unemployment compensation programs is directly
related to the amount of funds paid out in claims, will receive a windfall. Id.
... See note 163 supra.
248 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(2)(C)(ii) (1970).
249 VERMONT WELFARE REG. § 2333.1 defines unemployment as follows:
An unemployed father is one whose minor children are in need because he is out
of work, is working part-time, or is not at work due to an industrial dispute (strike),
for at least 30 days prior to receiving assistance, provided that:
(3) He is not receiving Unemployment Compensation during the same week as
assistance is granted.
Quoted in Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 711-12 (1975) (emphasis in Philbrook). The
regulation had been applied by Vermont to exclude unemployed fathers who were eligible for
unemployment compensation. Id. at 712.
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ceiving state unemployment compensation challenged the state
practice and the statutory provision of the Social Security Act.250 In
each case the amount of benefiis received from unemployment
compensation was significantly less than the benefits the fathers
would have received under AFDC-UF. 251 The unemployed fathers
therefore argued that they had been deprived of an income equal to
the state level of benefits252 in violation of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the federal constitution.253 A three-judge dis-
trict court in 1973 avoided the constitutional questions by interpret-
ing the statutory provision to afford unemployed fathers who are
otherwise eligible for AFDC an option to receive unemployment or
AFDC benefits. 2 54 The Vermont regulation as applied was struck
down as being inconsistent with the Social Security Act. 255
Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellants, Vermont
and HEW, conceded that section 407(b)(2)(C)(ii) is addressed to a
"father [who] receives unemployment compensation 256 rather than
to a father who is eligible for unemployment compensation. 25 7 Nev-
ertheless, they argued that this provision must be considered in
conjunction with the entire statutory scheme. The appellants
pointed out that giving applicants the option to receive AFDC-UF or
unemployment, whichever is greater, is inconsistent with the ap-
proach to non-AFDC income and resources required by section
402(a)(7) of the Act.2 58 Section 402(a)(7) requires state plans to
"provide that the State agency shall, in determining need, take into
consideration any other income and resources of any child or rela-
tive claiming aid to families with dependent children. 2 5 9 The policy
underlying the statutory provision is made explicit in the federal
regulation requiring states to "carry out policies with reference to
applicants' and recipients' potential sources of income that can be
developed to a state of availability. '2 60 Appellants argued that allow-
250 Glodgett v. Betit, 368 F. Supp. 211 (D. Vt. 1973).
251 Id. at 213; Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 712 (1975).
25'2 "Level of benefits" is used to refer to the maximum amount of money Vermont
furnished to AFDC recipients. See note 53 supra.
25 368 F. Supp. 211, 213 (D. Vt. 1973). By requiring fathers who were eligible for both
unemployment compensation and AFDC to collect unemployment checks, the state forced the
plaintiffs to subsist on grants far below the amounts they would have received under AFDC-
UF.
254 Id. at 217-18.
255 Id. at 218.
256 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(2)(C)(ii) (1970) (emphasis added).
257 Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975).
258 Id.
259 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (1970).
260 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ix) (1975).
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ing unemployed fathers to decline unemployment benefits for
which they are entitled in order to qualify for AFDC-UF under-
mines the policy requiring AFDC recipients to exhaust potential
sources of income.26'
The Supreme Court, affirming the judgment of the lower
court, found the appellants' argumerit "based on intersectional
harmony" unpersuasive. 262 But it also expressed dissatisfaction with
its holding, noting that total disqualification from AFDC upon re-
ceipt of unemployment compensation is not consistent with the
overall AFDC scheme:263
If § 407(b)(2) had been intended to fit smoothly into the AFDC
program, then assistance payments should be reduced by the
amount of unemployment compensation received by a father; this
much the federal appellant concedes. But Congress has expressly
provided otherwise: receipt of unemployment compensation re-
sults in termination of AFDC benefits. The appellants are simply
incorrect when they characterize their construction of
§ 407(b)(2)(C)(ii) as consistent with the overall pattern of the
AFDC program while assailing the District Court's interpretation
as fundamentally disruptive; the fact of the matter is that neither
construction is harmonious with the program's general approach
to income and resources. 264
Since the statutory language provides no basis for reducing rather
than terminating AFDC-UF benefits by the amount of unemploy-
ment compensation, the Court suggested that the appellants address
their arguments to Congress. 265
D. State Supplemental Work Programs
In an effort to reduce the number of AFDC recipients by
encouraging employment, Congress in 1967 amended the Social
261 421 U.S. at 714.
262 Id. at 715.
2163 Id. Normally, the non-AFDC income of an AFDC household is deducted from the
amount of benefits a family with no income would receive (subject to certain income exemp-
tions), and the family's grant is reduced accordingly. Benefits are terminated only if the
household's income from other sources exceeds the state benefit level. Although the methods
used by the states in calculating the amount of a family's benefits vary widely (see HANDBOOK,
supra note 16, at 161-63), income reduces but does not terminate the grant, unless it exceeds a
specified maximum. See note 53 supra.
264 421 U.S. 707, 715 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
26 Id. at 719. The Court returned to the King-Townsend-Remillard triology (see note 163
supra) to support its finding that the Vermont practice of excluding unemployed fathers who
were eligible for unemployment compensation conflicted with 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(2)(C)(ii)
(1970). 421 U.S. at 719. The Court's indication that states had little or no discretion in defining
unemployment for purposes of AFDC-UF supports the district court decisions holding that
states may not exclude from their coverage individuals who were discharged for misconduct.
See notes 226-41 and accompanying text supra.
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Security Act to establish the Work Incentive Program (WIN).266
Under WIN, nonexempt persons267 on AFDC rolls are referred to
the Secretary of Labor for participation in a compulsory program
providing them with job training or with employment in the regular
economy or in special work projects.268 Unless exempt, registration
and participation in the WIN program are conditions of eligibility
for individual AFDC benefits. 26 9
When Congress enacted the WIN program, twenty-one states
already required AFDC recipients to participate in state work pro-
grams; 270 twenty-three states now have work requirements in excess
of WIN.27' Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in New York State
Department of Social Services v. Dublino,272 lower courts had adhered to
the rationale of Townsend v. Swank273 and held that such supplemen-
tal work programs, to the extent they restricted the class of persons
otherwise eligible under federal law, were preempted by WIN.274
Dublino, however, made it clear that states are free to supplement the
WIN program with additional work requirements of their own.275
The Court suggested that such supplemental programs might even
impose additional eligibility requirements on AFDC recipients,2 7 6 so
long as the particular work requirements do not conflict with specific
provisions of the Social Security Act.2 77
In most states, not all AFDC recipients have access to a WIN
266 Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, tit. 2, § 204, 81 Stat. 884 (codified in 42 U.S.C.
§§ 602(a)(19)(A), 603-44 (1970)).
267 Certain AFDC recipients are exempted from the WIN program. Those individuals
include children under 16 or attending school full-time until age 22, the aged or incapacitated,
mothers of pre-school age children, individuals needed in the home to care for ill or incapaci-
tated household members, mothers of children whose father is registered for WIN, and
individuals so remote from a WIN program as to preclude participation. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(19)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974).
218 Id. §§ 602(a)(19)(G)(ii), 632(b).
269 Id. §§ 602(a)(19)(A), 602(a)(19)(F).
270 See New York State Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 414 (1973).
271 HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 156-57.
272 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
273 404 U.S. 282 (1971). See note 163 supra.
274 See Woolfolk v. Brown, 456 F.2d 652 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Woolfolk I]; Woolfolk v. Brown, 358 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Va. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as Woolfolk II]; Bueno v. Juras, 349 F. Supp. 91 (D. Ore. 1972); Jefferies v.
Sugarman, 345 F. Supp. 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd, 481 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1973).
275 413 U.S. 405, 422 (1973). Dublino casts some doubt on the continuing viability of the
King-Townsend-Remillard test for the validity of state-imposed eligibility conditions, and has
been interpreted varyingly by lower courts. See Note, AFDC Eligibility Conditions Unrelated to
Need: The Impact of Dublino, 49 IND. L.J. 334, 344 (1974).
276 413 U.S. at 422.
277 Id. at 422-23.
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program.2 7 8 The Social Security Act provides for the establishment
of work incentive programs only in areas of a state where there are
significant numbers of potential WIN registrants..2 79 An individual
"so remote from a work incentive project that his effective participa-
tion is precluded" is specifically exempted from the requirements of
registration and participation in WIN.280 Dublino allows states to
implement supplementary work programs in "remote" localities; 281
an individual exempt from WIN is therefore not necessarily exempt
from all work requirements.
Woolfolk v. Brown282 [hereinafter cited as Woolfolk III] presents
the only detailed examination since Dublino of the consistency be-
tween a state's work rules and the Social Security Act. Interpreting
Dublino not to preclude specific findings of inconsistency, the court
in Woolfolk III invalidated certain provisions of Virginia's employ-
ment program.2 83 The major issue concerned Virginia's attempt to
exempt from WIN all individuals residing in areas with no WIN
program, without regard to a given AFDC recipient's distance from
a WIN program. 28 4 As a result, residents of counties lacking a local
278 See id. at 418-19; Woolfolk v. Davidson, 393 F. Supp. 263, 279 (E.D. Va. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as Woolfolk III].
279 42 U.S.C. § 632(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). Under the Department of Labor regulation
governing registration for WIN, an individual is exempted from the program on the basis of
remoteness if "more than a total of 10 hours would be required for a normal work or training
day including round trip by reasonable [sic] available public transportation from his home to
the WIN project." 29 C.F.R. §§ 56.4(a)(6) (1975).
280 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(A)(iii) (Supp. IV, 1974).
281 413 U.S. at 421.
282 393 F. Supp. 263 (E.D. Va. 1975). Earlier cases bearing the same name are cited
herein as Woolfolk I & II. For a brief discussion of these cases see note 284 infra.
283 See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-133.7 to -133.15 (Supp. 1975). The Virginia work program
required every local welfare agency to determine whether or not applicants or recipients were
employable. Id. § 63.1-133.10. All employable persons, as a condition of eligibility, had to
register with the local employment office and accept reasonable employment or training. Id. §
63.1-133.12. The criteria for exemption from the work or training requirements paralleled
those established in the Social Security Act. See note 267 supra; VA. DEP'T OF WELFARE, WORK
RULE MATERIAL, § A, quoted in Woolfolk III, 393 F. Supp. 263, 270-75 (E.D. Va. 1975).
284 393 F. Supp. at 279. The work program in question was the third such program
adopted by Virginia since 1967. The first and the second were struck down by the same judge
in decisions prior to Dublino. See note 274 and accompanying text supra; Woolfolk I, 325 F.
Supp. 1162 (E.D. Va. 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 652 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972);
Woolfolk II, 358 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Va. 1973). The former work rules also excluded
individuals in non-WIN localities regardless of their proximity to WIN programs; these rules
were struck down on the theory that WIN preempted state work programs. Judge Merhige, in
Woolfolk I, concluded that the Social Security Act required specific, individual findings that the
applicant or recipient was exempt from WIN by reason of his location. 325 F. Supp. at 1175.
But the case was decided on the ground of preemption. Id. at 1171. Although other objection-
able aspects of the first two work programs were corrected by the third, the blanket exemption
of non-WIN localities was retained. See VA. DEP'T OF WELFARE, WORK RULE MATERIAL, § A,
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WIN program were, regardless of their proximity to a WIN pro-
gram, required to register for and participate in the state work
program rather than in WIN. 28 5
The Woolfolk III court, after examining the legislative history of
WIN and the applicable federal regulations,286 concluded that the
Social Security Act requires individual determinations of remote-
ness for AFDC recipients residing in counties not serviced by the
WIN program, before such individuals may be subjected to state work
rules.28 7 The Virginia work rule, which exempted from WIN regis-
tration individuals neither "remote" nor otherwise exempt from
WIN under federal law and forced them to register for the state
program, was struck down as inconsistent with the provision of the
Social Security Act specifically requiring all AFDC applicants and
recipients to register for WIN unless exempt under the statute.288
quoted in Woolfolk III, 393 F. Supp. 263, 270-71 (E.D. Va. 1975). The state in Woolfolk III,
relying on Dublino, argued that the third work rule did not contravene specific provisions of
the Social Security Act. Id. at 267.
285 393 F. Supp. at 279. It is not clear why the state preferred to enroll such individuals in
the state work program rather than WIN. One possible explanation is administrative conveni-
ence. Under the program Virginia designed, determinations of remoteness would not have to
be made on an individual basis.
286 The court drew extensively from its analysis of the issue in Woolfolk I, 325 F. Supp.
1162, 1175-76 (E.D. Va. 1971). See note 284 supra. Noting that the interpretation of the
remoteness exemption by HEW and the Department of Labor was ambiguous, the court
turned to the legislative history of the 1967 WIN amendments. 393 F. Supp. at 278. The
House Report, stating that "[a]ll adults in AFDC families.., are expected to be considered for
participation in [the WIN] program[,]" (H. R. REP. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 104-05 (1967)),
was cited by the court in support of its view that the remoteness exemption required as a
corollary that all recipients living in a non-WIN area who were not actually remote be
registered for WIN. 393 F. Supp. at 279. Also cited was the Department of Labor regulation
defining the remoteness exemption as encompassing only those individuals who would have to
spend over ten hours on a normal working day in order to participate in the program, 29
C.F.R. § 56.4(a)(6) (1975). 393 F. Supp. at 279.
287 393 F. Supp. at 279-80.
288 Id. After resolving the main issue in the case, Judge Merhige went on to find other
specific conflicts between the work rule and WIN. The employment program made no
provision for voluntary registration for WIN by exempted individuals residing in non-WIN
areas. The court found that this omission conflicted with a Department of Labor regulation
giving all exempt AFDC recipients the right to participate voluntarily in the WIN program, 29
C.F.R. § 56.4(f) (1975). 393 F. Supp. at 280-81.
Under the work rule, participants were required to accept jobs at wages below the lowest
allowable wage for WIN participants. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-133.8(a) (1975 Supp.)
with 29 C.F.R. §§ 56.26(c)(1) (1975). Since the wage provisions of the state rule allowed
participants to be placed in jobs considered inappropriate for WIN participants, Judge
Merhige concluded that the state rule conflicted with the Social Security Act. 393 F. Supp. at
281.
Finally, the court struck down an additional eligibility condition imposed on participants
in the state work program. Benefits were denied to any individual who willfully refused to
accept medical or dental care, except surgery involving risk, which would render him employ-
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E. Emergency Assistance
In 1968, Congress amended the Social Security Act 28 9 to estab-
lish a new program, Emergency Assistance for Needy Families With
Children (EANFC),290 which provides for short-term assistance
within the framework of AFDC to children of needy families facing
financial emergencies.29 ' Under the EANFC program, certain low-
income families are eligible for temporary assistance if the family
has no available resources and assistance is necessary to avoid des-
titution.2 92 The only restriction placed on the cause of the family's
financial crisis is that the destitution may not arise out of a refusal to
accept employment.293 The class of potential EANFC recipients is
much larger than the class of AFDC families:294 under federal law,
able. VA. DEP'T OF WELFARE WORK RuLE MATERIAL § E.3, quoted in Woolfolk III, 393 F. Supp.
273, 274 (E.D. Va. 1975). Under this provision, a participant in the state program who was
considered incapacitated under federal standards would be forced to undergo medical treat-
ment in order to remain eligible for AFDC. This eligibility condition was struck down as
placing a "greater burden upon work rule participants than [was] placed upon those par-
ticipating in WIN .. " 393 F. Supp. at 281.
The last two findings are of questionable validity underDublino. Both are based on Judge
Merhige's conviction that exempt AFDC beneficiaries cannot be placed "at a disadvantage
when compared with those AFDC applicants or recipients for whom WIN registration is
mandatory." Id. Nothing in Dublino requires participants in a state supplementary work
program to be treated equally with WIN participants; to the contrary, Dublino expressly
authorizes unequal treatment by allowing states to impose eligibility conditions in addition to
those required under WIN. 413 U.S. at 422.
289 Act ofJan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, tit. 2, § 206, 81 Stat. 893 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 603(a)(5), 606(e) (1970)).
290 42 U.S.C. § 606(e) (1970) provides:
(1) The term "emergency assistance to needy families with children" means any
of the following, furnished for a period not in excess of 30 days in any 12-month
period, in the case of a needy child under the age of 21 who is (or, within such period
as may be specified by the Secretary, has been) living with any of the relatives
specified in subsection (a)(1) of this section in a place of residence maintained by one
or more of such relatives as his or their own home, but only where such child is
without available resources, the payments, care, or services involved are necessary to
avoid destitution of such child or to provide living arrangements in a home for such
child, and such destitution or need for living arrangements did not arise because such
child or relative refused without good cause to accept employment or training for
employment....
2'1 For a general description and analysis of the EANFC program, see Note, Meeting
Short-Term Needs of Poor Families: Emergency Assistance for Needy Families With Children, 60
CORNELL L REv. 879 (1975).
Participation in the program is optional, and states may incorporate EANFC into their
AFDC plans. Twenty-nine states currently provide emergency assistance to needy families
under approved plans. See HANDBOOK, supra note 16, at 145. Families covered by EANFC
programs and the types of emergencies for which assistance is available vary from state to
state. See note 298 infra.
292 42 U.S.C. § 606(e) (1970).
293 Id.
294 The AFDC definition of "child" is expanded under EANFC to include all individuals
between the ages of 18 and 2 1, rather than only those attending school or vocational programs
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families who do not meet the AFDC eligibility conditions in terms of
need 2 95 or family composition, 296 may nevertheless qualify for
EANFC.2 9
7
Most states participating in the EANFC program, however, do
not furnish assistance to the full extent authorized by the Social
Security Act.298 They typically exclude from EANFC coverage
either non-AFDC families or emergency needs occasioned by un-
enumerated causes, or both.299 In light of recent litigation, such
attempts by the states to narrow the scope of the EANFC program
are of questionable validity.300
on a full-time basis as is the case under the AFDC program. See 42 U.S.C. § 606(e) (1970).
More significantly, any needy child residing with one of the relatives specified in the AFDC
provisions (see id. § 606(a)) is deemed to be eligible for emergency assistance, whether or not
the child has been "deprived of parental support or care." Thus, intact families, who are
ineligible for AFDC unless the father is unemployed and the state has adopted an AFDC-UF
program, may receive emergency assistance. Id. § 606(e).
295 Although 42 U.S.C. § 606(e)(1) (1970) requires emergency assistance recipients to be
"needy," "without available resources," and destitute, there is no requirement that state
definitions of need or destitution parallel the state standards of need for AFDC. The legisla-
tive history of the programs arguably indicates an intent to extend EANFC to families
ineligible for AFDC. The Senate Report states:
The eligible families involved [in EANFC] are those with children under 21 who
either are, or have recently been, living with close relatives. The families do not have
to be receiving, or eligible upon application to receive, AFDC (although they are
generally of the same type), but they must be without a (sic] available resources and
the payment or service must be necessary in order to meet an immediate need that
would not otherwise be met.
S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 166 (1967).
296 See note 294 supra.
297 See notes 294-95 supra.
298 For example, the District of Columbia, Massachusetts, and Illinois provide emergency
assistance only to families eligible for AFDC or general assistance. D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-209
(1973); Baxter v. Minter, 378 F. Supp. 1213 (D. Mass. 1974), discussed in notes 301-304 and
accompanying text infra; Mandley v. Trainor, 523 F.2d F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1975), discussed in
notes 305-10 and accompanying text infra.
Connecticut and New York refuse to provide EANFC relief for emergencies caused by
theft or diversion of a family's assistance check (see notes 319-20 and accompanying text infra);
Illinois restricts EANFC to families forced out of their homes (see note 318 and accompanying
text infra); and in Connecticut, a family whose destitution is due to a household member's fault
is denied EANFC (see note 320 infra).
299 HEW regulations, interpreting the EANFC statutory provisions as permitting but not
requiring states to extend EANFC to the full extent authorized, afford states a wide range of
discretion in determining the classes of families eligible for EANFC and the types of emergen-
cies for which assistance will be provided:
A State plan.., providing for emergency assistance to needy families with children
must:
(I) Specify the eligibility conditions imposed for the receipt of emergency assis-
tance. These conditions may be more liberal than those applicable to other parts of
the [AFDC] plan ....
(3) Specify the emergency needs that will be met ....
45 C.F.R. § 233.120(a) (1975).
200 See notes 301-323 and accompanying text infra.
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In Baxter v. Minter,301 the Massachusetts practice of limiting
emergency assistance to persons falling under the AFDC income
ceiling was upheld on the theory that states have broad discretion
under federal law to establish standards of need for welfare recip-
ients.30 2 Relying upon the Supreme Court cases affirming a state's
power to establish its own standards of need for AFDC purposes,30 3
the federal district court concluded that the terms "needy" and
"destitution," left undefined by Congress, were intended to be
supplied by the states.3 °4
In contrast to Baxter, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
Mandley v. Trainor305 struck down an Illinois emergency assistance
program30 6 that, inter alia, failed to include within its coverage
non-AFDC families. 30 7  Extending the rationale of the King-
Townsend-Remillard trilogy308 to EANFC, 30 9 the court held that the
301 378 F. Supp. 1213 (D. Mass. 1974).
302 In Baxter, the plaintiff, whose application for emergency assistance was denied be-
cause her family's income exceeded the state's AFDC and general assistance standards of
need, argued that the Massachusetts practice violated the equal protection clause and con-
flicted with the Social Security Act. The equal protection claim was dismissed as "insubstan-
tial." Nevertheless, the court, assuming arguendo that the constitutional claim was sufficient
for jurisdictional purposes, went on to consider the statutory claim of inconsistency with the
Act. Id. at 1217.
303 See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 541 (1972); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397,
408 (1970); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478-80 (1970).
304 378 F. Supp. at 1220. Although the legislative history of the program indicates that
Congress intended to extend EANFC to families ineligible for AFDC (see note 295 supra), the
court interpreted the legislative history to authorize broader eligibility requirements only in
the context of conditions unrelated to need (see note 294 supra), leaving the states free to
establish their own standards of need for emergency assistance. 378 F. Supp. at 1218. But see
Wagner v. Liddle, 83 Misc. 2d 424, 372 N.Y.S. 2d 790 (Sup. Ct. N.Y., 1975) (upholding
destitution as sole eligibility criterion for emergency assistance; whether or not applicant
financially eligible for AFDC immaterial).
305 523 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1975).
306 Under the Illinois EANFC program, assistance was restricted to families eligible for
AFDC and was available only where an "emergent need" existed. The definition of "emergent
need" was limited to several specific crisis situations. See note 318 and accompanying textinfra.
307 The second issue decided in Mandley is discussed in note 318 and accompanying text
infra.
308 See note 163 supra.
309 523 F.2d 415, 422 (7th Cir. 1975). In holding that a state may not deny AFDC to
individuals who are eligible under federal standards, the AFDC cases have relied on
§ 402(a)(10) of the Social Security Act. This section states that "aid to families with dependent
children shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals." 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(10) (1970). There is no comparable provision in the emergency assistance section of
the statute. See id. § 606(e).
In Mandley, the government argued that the absence of such a provision was fatal to the
contention that the AFDC cases applied to emergency assistance. 523 F.2d at 422. The court,
however, found the argument unpersuasive. It stated that § 602(a) and § 606(e) could not "be
so neatly and completely severed." Id. Noting various interconnections between the
emergency assistance provisions and the minimum requirements for state AFDC plans, the
court interpreted § 602(a)(10) to apply, at least by analogy, to § 606(e):
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state must furnish EANFC to all families eligible for emergency
assistance under the federal statute, regardless of the family's AFDC
status. 31 0
Although Baxter and Mandley take inconsistent positions on the
permissible scope of state discretion under the EANFC program, 31'
they can be reconciled by interpreting the Mandley holding as being
limited to eligibility conditions unrelated to need312 and expressing
no opinion on the issue of the claimant's income level raised in
Baxter.31 3 Since the appellants' need in Mandley was not questioned
by the court or the parties,3 14 and since the Supreme Court cases
cited by the court in support of its holding apply only to federal
eligibility conditions unrelated to need,315 such an interpretation is
reasonable, despite the court's failure to expressly limit its holding to
non-need factors.316
Attempts by the states to limit the types of emergencies for
which EANFC is available have been uniformly rejected by the
courts in recent months. 31 7 In Mandley, the Illinois emergency assis-
tance program was invalidated because it restricted EANFC to three
narrow crisis situations, dealing primarily with evictions.31 8 Other
The close relationship between Sections 602(a) and 606(e) leads us to believe that
Congress intended that Section 606(e) be treated in the same way as Section 606(a),
which also is closely related to Section 602, despite the inclusion in Section 602(a)(10)
of the phrase "families with dependent children." The Supreme Court cases listed
earlier in the opinion [Burns v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975); Carleson v. Remillard,
406 U.S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971); King v. Smith, 392
U.S. 309 (1968)] hold that Congress intended the eligibility requirements of Section
606(a) to be mandatory on the states [citations omitted]. It therefore appears that
Congress intended that the eligibility provisions of Section 606(e) be mandatory on
the states, just as the courts have held with respect to the eligibility requirements of
Section 606(a).
Id.
310 Id.
31 Baxter holds that states may restrict their emergency assistance programs to families
financially eligible for AFDC. Mandley, on the other hand, rejects Illinois's attempt to limit its
EANFC coverage to AFDC applicants or recipients.
3"2 See note 294 supra.
313 See notes 301-04 and accompanying text supra.
314 Although the facts in Mandley are not clear, the appellants' need seems to have been
assumed'by the court and by the parties. 523 F.2d at 415.
31' See note 309 supra. The states' power to define standards of need has been firmly
established and was not raised as an issue in the case.
316 See 523 F.2d at 422.
317 See notes 318-23 and accompanying text infra.
318 523 F.2d at 422. Under the Illinois EANFC program, payments were restricted to
situations in which an "emergent need" existed. An "emergent need" was defined as one of the
following situations:
1. The AFDC family is homeless (without shelter) as a result of damage to the
building rendering it uninhabitable (example: fire, condemnation).
2. A court-ordered eviction occurs for reasons other than the recipient's failure
to pay rent.
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courts have invalidated emergency assistance regulations that
excluded from their program's coverage families whose destitution
was caused by theft or diversion of their public assistance grants, 19
catastrophes other than natural disasters,3 20 or catastrophes other
than civil disorders. 321 Although the grounds for these decisions
have varied,322 the courts have demonstrated virtually unanimous
opposition to restrictions placed on the cause of the family's destitu-
tion.3 2 3
3. The AFDC family is potentially homeless due to damage to a portion of the
building.
ILL. DEP'T OF PUBLIC AID, CATEGORICAL AsSISTANCE MANUAL ch. 6500, quoted in Mandley v.
Trainor, 523 F.2d 415, 418-19 (7th Cir. 1975). The court struck down the regulation as
inconsistent with the Social Security Act, relying on the analysis described in notes 309-10 and
accompanying text supra. The court read the federal statute to require states to provide
emergency assistance to destitute families, without regard to the cause of destitution. 523 F.2d
at 422.
"' Jones v. Berman, 37 N.Y.2d 42, 332 N.E.2d 303, 371 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1975). 18
NYCRR § 372.2(c) (July 31, 1975) (repealed) provided unconditionally that "[e]mergency
assistance shall not be provided when destitution is due to loss, theft, or diversion of a grant
already made." The New York Court of Appeals struck down this regulation on the ground
that it added a requirement that did not exist under state law. Although the state emergency
assistance provisions were virtually identical to the federal provisions, the court did not reach
the question of the regulation's consistency with federal law. Id. at 53, 332 N.E.2d at 308, 371
N.Y.S. at 429. For an application of theJones decision, see Bryant v. Lavine, 48 App. Div.2d
815, 370 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1975).
Prior to theJones decision, at least one New York court had invalidated the regulation on
the basis of the supremacy clause. Young v. Shuart, 67 Misc. 2d 689, 325 N.Y.S.2d 113 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y., 1971), modified, 39 App. Div. 2d 724, 331 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1972). For an analysis of
Young, see Note, Meeting Short-Term Needs of Poor Families, supra note 291, at 888-89.
320 Burrell v. Norton, 381 F. Supp. 339 (D. Conn. 1974). Under 1 CONN. WELFARE
MANUAL § 5030(6), quotedin 381 F. Supp. at 341, welfare recipients could claim EANFC where
"a catastrophic event or an eviction" occurred. A catastrophic event was defined as "a situation
that arises suddenly because of a natural disaster of a fire or flood over which the recipient has
no control and there is a substantial destruction of food, shelter, clothing or household
furnishings." 381 F. Supp. at 341. The regulation was found to create an arbitrary and
irrational distinction between loss due to natural causes and loss due to other causes, such as
theft, in violation of the equal protection clause. Id. at 342-44.
Under the Connecticut'EANFC program, emergency assistance could be furnished only
if the loss resulted from circumstances beyond the control of the individual. See id. at 341.
Although the program's fatilt condition was not at issue in Burrell because the plaintiff's loss
was unquestionably beyond her control, the court appeared to endorse the fault condition as
an acceptable part of EANFC. See id. at 343. For arguments against the validity of state
ENAFC programs that condition emergency assistance on lack of fault, see Note, Meeting
Short-Term Needs of Poor Families, supra note 291, at 889-91.
321 Williams v. Wohlgemuth, 400 F. Supp. 1309 (E.D. Pa. 1975). In Williams, a Pennsyl-
vania regulation limiting EANFC to needs resulting from natural disasters or civil disorders
was struck down as inconsistent with the Social Security Act. The court's analysis followed the
same lines as Mandley, discussed in noted 305-10 and accompanying text supra.
322 See notes 318-21 supra.
323 Baumes v. Lavine, 38 N.Y.2d 296, 342 N.E.2d 543, 379 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1975), how-
ever, departs from the general trend. In Baumes, the court upheld the denial of EANFC to
families who were without essential furniture because their previous furniture had deterior-
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CONCLUSION
State efforts to pare down welfare rolls by imposing additional
eligibility conditions on AFDC applicants were met with resistance
from the courts, particularly in the areas of EANFC, AFDC-UF, and
work programs. The courts, however, were legislatively overruled
by the child support bill, which can be expected to provide a fertile
source of litigation. In the area of financial eligibility, the courts have
exhibited a mixed response to the problems of defining countable
income: the income of another member of the household will not
necessarily be attributed to the AFDC recipient; yet the recipient's
own income, such as tax refunds or PSE earnings, will under most
circumstances be counted in determining financial eligibility. Al-
though HEW's attempt to cut costs by lowering resource exemptions
was unsuccessful, its quality control regulations should facilitate
accurate determinations of eligibility, thereby removing ineligibles
from the welfare rolls.
Carol H. Linden
ated. The court, obviously influenced by fear of duplicate payments and of reversion to the
special grant system, held that this situation did not constitute an emergency. To qualify for
EANFC, the court explained, the need must arise suddenly, out of a crisis situation; it cannot
be a foreseeable need created by everyday wear and tear. Id.
Although the court's opinion was carefully worded to appear that it was merely adherring
to a common sense definition of "emergency," the dissent pointed out that in fact the court was
restricting the availability of EANFC to a limited group of causes:
On this record I would conclude that these children are destitute and whether their
predicament was caused by gradual deterioration or a more dramatic natural disaster
the fact remains that they now face an emergency calling for immediate relief. There
is nothing in the statute which says that they are only entitled to assistance for
emergencies caused by sudden and unanticipated events and the regulation which
would add this sweeping restriction should be invalidated.
Id. at 306-07, 342 N.E.2d at 549, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 768-69 (dissenting opinion, Wachtler, J.).
